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Abstract

Although China is rapidly developing economically, militarily, and socially, it remains an

authoritarian country. Since the diplomatic breakthrough by Richard Nixon with China in

1972, successive administrations in Washington have held out the hope to American

citizens that China inevitably would democratize. Because of China's economic and

growing military power in the international arena, the United States government and

other free nations believe that it is important to urge the Chinese government to be

responsible in terms of its protection of human rights and support of other democratic

tenets, domestically and internationally, as well as to be a role model for other

developing-nation governments in its friendly coexistence with the West and adherence

to international norms. However, the central government and most citizens of China do

not see the need for their country to democratize along the lines of Western democracy.

This thesis explores why China is unlikely to democratize in the foreseeable future, even

if there is continued modernization and further growth of China's middle class. It

provides a definition of democracy against which the political realities of China are

measured. Lack of religious freedom, a poor track record on human rights, and

ineffective pro-democracy movements are closely analyzed. There have been various

projections that the rising middle class eventually will demand political participation and,

therefore, that China will move assuredly toward Western-style democratization. The

thesis argues that this scenario is not likely, in part because the rising

middle class lacks

a basic understanding and appreciation of the fundamentals of democracy, as revealed by

"pro-democracy" movements such as the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, that in fact

did not seek Western-style liberal democracy. Particularly in the case of 1989, the

movement was an opportunity for participating students to challenge the government to

vi

meet their needs, rather than a demand for a fundamental change in China's authoritarian

political system. Since 1989, the "pro-democracy" movement has all but vanished, and

members of the middle class seemingly have become advocates of preservation of the

authoritarian status quo. This could change if current economic realities in China become

harsher, but indications for now point to the continuation of China as an authoritarian

one-party state.

vii

Chapter 1

Introduction

The care of human life and happiness, and not their destruction,
is the first and only object of good government.

-Thomas Jefferson to Maryland Republicans, 1809.

Thomas Jefferson and other founding fathers of the United States were responsible for

establishing a political system of governance called democracy. The meaning of Western-

style democracy is resisted and sometimes misunderstood by countries that criticize this

form of government. In authoritarian countries such as the People's Republic of China

(PRC), there is little basic understanding of the fundamentals of democracy as they are

known and practiced in East Asia's five countries that are rated as liberal democracies

(Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines), let alone in the West,

where democracy is much more firmly rooted. The democratic movements in China that

were led by mostly educated members of the middle class were largely a response to

problems in economic transition, rather than aimed at securing democracy in China. None

of the democracy movements ever called for the overturn of the Chinese Communist

Party (CCP). With the exception of Wei Jingsheng's call for a fifth modernization,

democracy, during the Democracy Wall Movement of 1978-1979, these movements were

chiefly an expression of misapprehension about changing economic and social conditions,

as well as calls for the government to meet the needs of the protesters. Taking into

consideration Beijing's political repression, including suppression of student movements,

persecution of religious groups whose activities are not controlled by the government,

alleged proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, unfair trade practices, and demand

for the continued one-party state, it is fair to say that China remains absolutist and

1

unlikely to lean toward democracy in the near future.

For nearly a century, China's leaders and the government have promised its

people some form of democracy.

However, the term democracy was understood

2

differently by Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping,

and in none of these cases

did the leader understand democracy as it was embraced in the West. Sun Yat-sen's

vision of democracy was colored by the ideas of Confucius, and he "added Western

3

elements only when they were useful to the Chinese environment. "

Confronted with a

disastrous beginning to the Republic of China, founded in 1 9 1 2 , Sun proposed a three-

phase process to achieve self-government after a revolutionary party won control of

power: (1) a three-year period of military rule followed by, (2) political tutelage

government under a revolutionary party, and, eventually, (3) self-rule, governed by a

republican constitution. Phases one and two unfortunately resulted in a party dictatorship

4

led by Chiang Kai-shek.

Mao Zedong promised a new China, which would ensure a

democratic dictatorship under the proletariat. In his famous essay, "The People's

Democratic Dictatorship," Mao suggested that, in order to abolish classes and create

I

Minxin Pei, "Is China Democratizing?"Foreign Affairs (January/February 1998) http://proquest.umi.com.
ezproxy.shu.edu/pqdweb?index=7 &did=25 I I 2129&SrchMode=3&sid= l&Fmt=4& Vlnst= PROD& VType=
PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=l232313374&clientld=5171&aid=I (accessed January 18, 2009).
2

John L. Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China," Foreign Affairs
(January/February 2008), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080 IO I faessay87 IO l/john-1-thornton/Iong-time
coming.html (accessed February I, 2009).
3

Eric Chiyeung, "Building Constitutional Democracy on Oriental Foundations: An Autonomy of Sun Yat
sen's Constitutionalism," http://hc.rediris.es/09/articulos/pdf/16.pdf (accessed February I, 2009).
4

Edmund S. K. Fung, In Search o
f Chinese Democracy: Civil Opposition in Communist China 1929-1949
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 3 1 .

2

5

Great Harmony, socialist and communist society would have to be established.

In the

process, Mao led China into class warfare that destroyed the lives of millions of victims.

Deng Xiaoping led China out of the anarchy of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution,

and declared that "democracy was a major condition for emancipating the mind.t" Yet,

he issued the Four Cardinal Principles in March 1979, precisely to prevent consideration

of political liberalization, and repeatedly suppressed movements that were characterized

as democratic in China, including the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. Despite the

various manifestations of China's so-called democracy, defined differently by different

leaders, China remains an authoritarian country. In truth, "democracy in its most general

7

sense has never actually been tried in China."

The Chinese Communist Party has full

control of political power, and China lacks many freedoms, as well as other fundamentals

of a true democracy.

The chapters ahead explore the nature of China's authoritarian regime, and

analyze the reasons why China is unlikely to experience political liberalization in the

foreseeable future, despite the predications of American presidential administrations,

going back to Richard Nixon's in the 1970s. Although successive administrations since

Nixon's have held out hope to the American public that China's steps toward democracy

have been inevitable, realities in China have shown little evidence that any generation of

communist leadership, including the current fourth generation led by Hu Jintao, has been

inclined toward power sharing and placing its confidence in the hands of the people.

5

R. Keith Schoppa, The Columbia Guide to Modern Chinese History (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1943), 293.
6

Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China."
"Andrew Nathan, China's Transition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), 63.

3

Chapter2

China's Failure to Liberalize:

Lack of a Fundamental Understanding of Democracy

The definition of democracy that underlines the analysis of this thesis is based on a

Western view of a democratic political system, which challenges the control of power of

authoritarian governments such as China's. On December 10, 1948, the General

Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,' to

promote peace, freedom, and justice in the world. The Declaration is based on Western-

style concepts of democracy, which encourage freedom of speech and expression of

individualism by each human being. All countries that are members of the United Nations

are expected to honor and promote these values. China, one of the five members of the

Security Council at the United Nations, has historically violated and continues to

disregard them. It has failed to establish a political system that protects human rights, and

its one-party system twists the accepted understanding of Western-style democracy, using

the term "democracy" in its own contorted fashion. For example, village elections in

China are controlled by state officials. Each participant has a voting record known by the

government, and most of the time the elected officials are Chinese Communist Party

members. As further example, according to the Chinese Constitution, all China's citizens

have a "right to the freedom ofreligious belief." Yet, each year, a number ofleaders and

members from the Catholic, Protestant, Islamic, and Tibetan Buddhist faiths are sent to

prisons or labor camps. The Falun Gong, whose members practice a mixture of Taoist

I

United Nations, "The Universal Declaration of Human Rights," http://www.un.org/Overview/rig
hts.html#a30 (accessed February 17, 2009).

4

and Buddhist beliefs, was declared an "evil cult" in 1999 and targeted for severe

suppression. Falun Gong members often have been tortured inhumanly, and in many

instances, they have died, owed to the brutality. State officials, who control the media,

falsely accuse religionists and their movements and groups of being disruptive to society,

when in reality the Chinese government does not uphold the freedoms and rights that the

Chinese Constitution allegedly provides. The media is a mechanism to advance the

government's control. For example, in an article of December 2008, China Daily

clarified the concept ofreligious freedom in the PRC: "Freedom of religious belief does

not mean religious activities are also free from government regulation or legal obligations.

To believe in a religion or not is a personal issue and a free choice, but religious activities,

2

which might affect other people, must be bound by law."

In sum, if the Chinese

government declares that a religion is disturbing to society or that it is an evil cult, state

officials have the right to imprison or otherwise harm the members of the offending

religious group.

China's Malformations of Democracy

Internationally, China sides with the regimes of countries such as Sudan, Pakistan, Iran,

Venezuela, Myanmar, and Russia that are internationally condemned for violating human

and civil rights. Western countries, such as the United States, stopped oil trade with

Sudan and banned weapons sales to Venezuela in protest against abuses by the regimes.

For decades, China has financed the Sudanese government, which has used the funding to

kill innocent civilians in Darfur. In February 2009, China and Venezuela agreed to

2

Liu Hongji, "A Breach of Constitution under Pretext of Religion," China Daily, December 5, 2008,
http://www.chinadaily.corn.cn/opinion/2008-12/05/content_ 72745 l O.htm (accessed February 18, 2009).

5

"double their joint investment fund to $ 1 2 billion and signed a raft of agreements to boost

co-operation." The Chinese government claims that trade and friendly relations with

countries that violate human rights are not based on politics, but rather on economics.

Not only does China support dictatorships abroad that deny their citizens the

chance for human fulfillment, but also Chinese officials misconstrue the definition of

democracy in China, by claiming that China endorses democratic values, yet

undermining basic fundamentals that make up a stable democratic political system, such

as free, fair, and frequent elections, public control of the national agenda, and the

protection of human rights as well as religious and other freedoms. Democracy originated

in the West. It has been adopted in former British colonies such as India, Canada, and

Australia, and is popular even in Hong Kong, where there has been a vigorous democracy

movement, albeit the region is not a democracy. It spread, heavily influenced by the

United States," to Japan, during the American occupation following World War II, and to

South Korea and Taiwan, in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. Western philosophers

such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill promoted Western-style democracy by fostering

the concept of natural rights and limits on government. These concepts have helped to

cultivate political stability and prosperity where they have been embraced. At the time of

Hong Kong's retrocession to China's sovereignty, Christopher Patten, Hong Kong's last

British governor, noted:

Freedom, democracy, the rule of law, stability, and prosperity are found
most frequently in one another's company. The relationship between these
aspects of the good and open society will be tested in all parts of Asia, but

3

"China and Venezuela Boost Links," BBC News Online, February 19, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7898809.stm (accessed February 19, 2009).
4

Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Cambridge, MA:
University of Oklahoma, 1993), 299.

6

most fiercely in China, whose die-hard leadership is intent on
5

demonstrating that Leninism and capitalism can happily co-exist.

Defining Western-Style Democracy

Before beginning a discussion of democracy in China, it is important to define democracy

in general terms according to a Western view, in order to analyze the different concept of

"democracy" that is espoused by China's government and generally by mainland Chinese

people. Effective participation and free, fair, and frequent elections are two fundamentals

of democracy in the West. Citizens have an equal opportunity to elect their leaders, thus

they can participate in shaping the national agenda. Through free, fair, and frequent

elections, citizens can have their voices heard, and elect a leader whom the majority of

the people want. These and other fundamental concepts of democracy are essential in the

democratic political system not only to protect citizens from the abuses of an

authoritarian government, but also to provide essential rights, general freedom, self-

6

determination, and opportunity for human development.

Because countries that have

transitioned into democracy historically have provided peace and prosperity for their

citizens," it is unlikely that democratic countries will go to war against each other. To

date, they have not.

Democracy protects its citizens from authoritarian governments and dictators who

are often driven by their paranoia, self-interest, ideology, religious belief, or just by a

' Christopher Pattern, East and West: China, Power, and the Future o
fAsia (New York: Time Books,
Random House, 1998), xii.
6

Robert Dahl, On Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998), 45.
7

Ibid.

7

8

plain impulse.

"Under Joseph Stalin's rule in the Soviet Union (1929-1953), many

millions of persons were jailed for political reasons often because of Stalin's paranoid

9

fear of conspiracies against him. "

Adolf Hitler, another autocratic ruler, was driven by

his ideology that led to the death of tens of millions of people during War World II, and

was responsible for the deaths of millions of people whom he wished to exterminate."

Although democracies are based on majority votes, and so-called tyranny of the majority

is often found in the democratic political system, democracy still protects its citizens

from autocratic rulers and obeys the ''universal code of human rights that is effectively

11

enforced throughout the world."

In order for a country to have democracy, there not only must be effective

participation of adult citizens, and free, fair and frequent elections, but also voting

equality, enlightened understanding of policies and their consequences, and citizen

12

control of the public agenda.

Effective participation means, "Before a policy is adopted

by the association, all the members must have equal and effective opportunities for

13

making their views known to the other members as to what the policy should be."

Also,

every citizen must have an equal opportunity to vote, and, therefore, all the votes must

count as equal. In order to have a fairly elected leader, the elections must be held

8

Ibid., 46.
'Ibid.
10

Ibid.
1t

Ibid., 47.

12

Ibid., 36.
13

Ibid., 37.

8

impartially, freely, and frequently, permitting citizens to express their preferences and to

14

maintain control of the public agenda.

Although democracies have flaws, democracy is widely believed to be the best

form of government. Beyond ensuring equitable elections, democracy regulates conflict,

15

provides for legitimate government, and promotes social stability as well.

By regulating

conflict, democracy avoids corruption and encourages the government to settle disputes

16

through legal process rather than through violence.

Instead of controlling many aspects

of people's daily lives, as done by the political system in China, democracy allows its

citizens to speak freely about their leaders; moreover, the government is inspired to make

decisions based on the public interest. If elected officials do not respond to public

interests and needs, they can be removed from office by voters. Policy issues usually are

debated in the public forum before resolution by the government, which allows the

17

people to express their opinions about them.

By stabilizing the government and

providing checks and balances, democracy protects its citizens from abusive dictators and

allows candidates who are running for office to settle their disputes and differences in a

peaceful manner.

14

Ibid., 95.
15

Andrew Nathan, Chinese Democracy: Lessons o
f Failure (Berkley, CA: California University Press,
1986), 22.
16

lbid.,224.
17

Ibid.

9

China's Failure to Democratize

The PRC has never had a national legislature elected through direct election by the

18

nation's adult citizens, or a strong opposition political party running in an election.

Although in 1 9 1 2 China attempted to establish a democratic republic, for the past century,

China has failed to move in the direction of democracy, and legislative members have

been unable to suppress the authority wielded by the party-state. Any movement toward

democracy was either subjected to severe limits, or marked by corruption.19 In 1 9 1 2 and

1 9 1 3 , a parliament was elected, consisting of a Senate elected by provincial assemblies

and a House elected by all male officials, consisting of about 10.5 percent of the

20
population.

The parliament was weak and never was permitted to excise its claimed

power.21 Later in 194 7 and 1948, the national government held elections for the National

Assembly, Legislative Yuan, and Control Yuan.22 "Once again these elections were never

completed, nor competitive, due to various reasons, including the wartime conditions and

the Kuomintang dominance of politics. "23 China did not progress in a direction of

democratization, because the elections were corrupt, unfair, infrequent, and the political

groups were unprincipled. At times, the participating voters refused to accept the

outcomes of elections, and the political actors outside the institutions did not obey the

24
laws that were passed by the legislature or respect the legal freedom of the press.

In

present-day China, village elections are led by corrupt leaders, and include nepotism and

18

Ibid., 22.
19

Ibid.
'0

Ibid.

21

Ibid.
22

Ibid.
23

Ibid.
24

Ibid.

10

vote buying.25 About 90 percent of village chiefs are Chinese Communist Party members,

and if a non-party member is elected, the CCP quickly recruits the individual, so that the

party remains in charge.26

As the Chinese Communist Party remains in power and the citizens cannot freely

choose their leaders, corruption undoubtedly will remain widespread in China, as there is

no permissible political opposition to power holders. Because few persons in China have

had an appreciation of the fundamental concepts of democracy, throughout history, China

has failed to establish an elected party that is capable of replacing the authoritarian

government.

CCP 's Corruption

Presently, corruption within the CCP remains a serious problem. Over 97,000 CCP

officials were disciplined in 2006, and 80 percent of them were found guilty of taking

7

bribes or violating financial regulations.2

In March 2007, Zheng Xiaoyu was sentenced

to death for taking bribes to approve untested medicine.

28

The medicine approved by

Zheng Xiaoyu killed and harmed many people in China. The former director of the Food

and Drug Administration took bribes and gifts worth of more than $832,000.29 The

CCP's corruption and the failure of the Food and Drug Administration to monitor

compliance to laws have caused the lives of innocent people. In September 2008, the

tainted milk scandal killed six infants, and sickened 300,000 people in China, other parts

" Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China."
26

Ibid.
27

Ibid.
28

"China's Top Drug Regulator Gets Death Sentence," MSNBC, May 29, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/18911849/ (accessed March 4, 2009).
29

Ibid.
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30

of Asia, and Africa.

Ice bars and yoghurt also have been contaminated with the

31

industrial chemical, melamine.

Milk stations were unregistered and unregulated, and

have been blamed for watering down milk and adding nitrogen-rich melamine, a

chemical used in the manufacturing of plastics, which falsified the quality checks for

32

appropriate levels of protein.

The melamine scandal resulted in the arrests of dozen of

farmers who were accused of violating the public trust, and of using toxic chemicals to

33

save money.

In January 2009, death sentences were given to three dairy milk producers,

Zhang Yujun, Geng Jinpin, and Gao Junjie, upon conviction of selling 600 tons of

34

melamine-tainted milk to dairy companies.

Although the CCP arrested and convicted

persons who were said to be responsible for the melamine milk scandal, the Chinese

government failed to regulate the nation's dairy industry that caused deaths and injuries

not only among the people of China, but abroad as well. Another case, which erupted in

February 2009 concerning the top milk company in China, Milk Deluxe, revealed

osteoblast protein, a dangerous substance that can cause various cancerous tumors, in the

35

company's product.

The United Nations and the World Health Organization have

pressured China to enforce stricter laws on food safety. The government of the United

States, along with European Union and other governments, including those oflndonesia,

Taiwan, Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Burundi, Brunei, and Tanzania,

30

Jane McCartney, "China Launches Crack-Down on Export Mille," Times Online, September 23, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article4807667.ece (accessed March 30, 2009).
31

Ibid.
32

Ibid.
33

David Barboza, "Death Sentences in Chinese Mille Case," New York Times, January 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/0l/23/world/asia/23mille.html (accessed March 24, 2009).
34

"Leading Chinese Mille Brand Accused of Causing Cancer," Asia News, February 13, 2009,
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=14476&size=A (accessed March 28, 2009).
35

Ibid.
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36

banned products made from Chinese-produced milk.

In recent years, China has

exported tainted food products with harmful pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and

antibiotics. Products that China does not monitor kill or injure innocent people.

Widespread corruption within the one-party government not only blocks democratic

development, but also violates human rights, domestically and internationally.

Repudiated Freedom o
f the Press

Lack of freedom of the press also inhibits democratic progress in China. The government

37

exercises great control over the media through government ownership and censorship.

There are various restrictions which the press must follow, and journalists are not allowed

to travel freely.

The government made an exception only from January 2007 into 2008,

in the run up to and during the Beijing Olympics (except in Tibet) for foreign and

38

mainland journalists to travel and report throughout China.

Even foreign journalists,

however, were prohibited from reporting about the anti-government protests in Beijing

during the Olympics. Since then, Chinese authorities have extended regulations, and

39

foreign media must obtain permission from local authorities to enter Tibet.

March 10,

2009, marked the fiftieth anniversary of the failed Tibetan uprising, and provoked many

40

demonstrations against China's government.

The authoritarian regime advocated strong

military presence, and high restrictions on the Internet as well as text messaging usage in

36

"EU Bans Baby Food with Chinese Milk," CNN, September 28, 2009,
http://cnn.com/2008/WORLD/asiapcf/09/25/china.milk/index.html (accessed March 23, 2009).
37

Thorton, "Long Time Coming: The Prospect for Democracy in China."
38

Ibid.
39

"China Must Address Press Freedom in Tibet," CPJ, March 9, 2009, http://cpj.org/2009/03/china-must
address-press-freedom-in-tibet.php (accessed April 20, 2009).
40

"Two Tibetans Arrested Amid Ongoing Media Restrictions," CPJ, March I 8, 2009,
http://cpj.org/2009/03 I two -tibetans -arrested-amid-ongoing-media-restricti.php (accessed April 20, 2009).
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41

Tibet.

On March 24, 2009, Google search engine reported that the You Tube video-

sharing Web site was blocked in China, because supporters of the Dalai Lama had

broadcast a video that showed the Chinese military brutally kicking and beating Tibetan

42

protestors during the March 2008 demonstrations.

The CCP not only "filters Internet

3

content and blocks material that is critical of its policies,',4

but also it imprisons and

threatens local as well as foreign members of the press who are critics of the regime.

During the March 2008 riots in Lhasa, the Chinese authorities arrested two local

filmmakers, Dhondup Wangchen and Jigme Gaytso, for taping interviews and making a

44

documentary about the lives of Tibetan residents under Chinese government rule.

The

filmmakers were held in prison for seven months, and no family members were ever

45

informed of their arrest.

Another case, which took place in February 2009, involved a

46

newspaper reporter, Liu Xu, who was stabbed and threatened by "unknown" persons.

Xu's Internet biogs included items censored by the Chinese authorities, such as the

47

melamine milk scandal and other incidents involving government corruption.

Because

2009 marks the twentieth anniversary of the June 4,1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, as

well as the tenth anniversary of the April 10,1999 Falun Gong crackdown, the

government has been on high alert to prevent anti-government demonstrations, and on the

41

Ibid.
42

Miguel Heft, "You Tube Blocked in China, Google Says," New York Times, March 24, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/25/technology/intemet/25youtube.html?_r= I &adxnnl= I &adxnnlx= 1240
373947-/zMRwDjRPA+ IOCXNya3n4Q (accessed April 20, 2009).
43

Ibid.
44

"CPJ Condemns China's Detention of Tibetan Filmmakers," CPJ, October 17, 2008,
http://cpj.org/2008/IO/ cpj-condemns-chinas-detention-of-tibetan-filmmaker.php (accessed April 20, 2009).

4'

Ibid.

46

Andrew Jacobs, "At Reading in Beijing, Noted Writer Is Stabbed," New York Times, February 15, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/16/world/asia/16china.html (accessed April 20, 2009).
47

Ibid.

14

lookout for any foreign and domestic press that could tarnish the reputation of the

authoritarian regime.

Democracy Redefined Chinese-Style

Democracy has a different meaning to the Chinese than it does to Westerners. China

experienced complex political changes during the twentieth century, and the concept of

democracy came to be understood by the Chinese people as the term was manipulated by

their authoritarian leaders. After 1949, Mao Zedong promoted "social democracy," but

not Western-style democracy. Social democracy advocated by Mao featured mass

48

revolutionary movements directed by mass mobilization.

Social democracy called for

"social harmony," that was turned toward the building of powerful government rather

49

than toward the promotion of individual rights and a limited government.

Mao's

ideology was based on Marxist analysis of social classes and social democracy. so In

direct contrast to Western-style democracy, Mao promoted class warfare and centralized

leadership. After Mao's death in 1976, Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reform and an

open-door policy which involved liberalization of government control over people's

private lives, but he limited social and institutional pluralism in order to boost economic

51

growth.

From social democracy and a command economy, China transitioned to a

social market economy. In this new economic system, the peasants were to determine
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how the land would be used.

This new policy encouraged people to establish their own

private businesses and attracted foreign investments. After 1978, China opened its doors

to foreign trade and its economy grew rapidly.

The open-door policy, along with the prospect for rapid economic growth,

inspired Chinese students to engage in three pro-democracy movements in 1978-1979,

1986, and 1989. However, rather than having a clear understanding of and desire for

democracy, the students were driven simply by outgrowths of the new reforms, and

sought high-paying jobs after graduating from universities. Since Deng Xiaoping's

suppression of the 1989 Tiananmen democracy movement and his death in 1997, the

CCP has remained in tight political control of China. Party members are under the strict

discipline of China's leadership in Beijing, and the CCP controls government agencies, as

53

well as national, provincial, and local legislatures and the courts.

Party members also

dominate life in the villages, and exercise influence in the military, industries, education,

54

and journalism; moreover, they censor the Internet.

The majority of people in China assume that their country possesses a democratic

system. This is because the CCP created a Chinese political system using the term

"democracy," based on its own interpretation of the term. Since effective participation in

elections is a main element of democracy, election terminology is used in China as well.

In China, many citizens vote periodically at a local level, and they might be even more

involved politically than some Westerners, but they have no influence over the selection
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53
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55

of officials above the village level, work place, or school.

They cannot create or

contribute money to pressure groups that could challenge the government, or elect a

leader or change a policy above their given community, work, or educational unit.

Although this sort of election allows citizens to frequently participate in a limited way in

local governance, the system is blatantly biased toward continued control by the existing

political establishment. Not only do the party officials keep a record of participants'

political attitudes, but also the system allows the leaders in Beijing to maintain total

political control over China's citizens. The CCP manipulates its people through steady

propaganda, leading them to believe that China is moving toward democracy. In reality,

56

"Chinese democracy involves participation without influence."

The concept of

democracy in China is generally understood in Chinese terms, based on China's cultural

57

heritage, and is not influenced by Western standards of democracy.

Is Democracy Possible in China?

There is no driving force for democracy in China. There has been much speculation that

the rising middle class would one day become the major force for China's

democratization. In truth, the middle class in China depends on the CCP for employment

and resources, and therefore it is not in its interest to oppose the government. The CCP

provides benefits to the majority of the members of the middle class. As long as

economic stability is provided, the middle class sees no need to oppose the government.

The middle-class citizens are, in many cases, entrepreneurs and successful business
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people. In 2004, it was estimated that 20 to 30 percent of them were CCP members, and,

therefore, they had an impact on matters such as property rights and reform of state-

58

owned enterprises (SOEs).

In contrast, the working class and the peasants suffer from excessive fees and

taxes, unfair compensation resulting from confiscation of land on which they dwell by

59

local officials, and the venality of law-enforcement officials.

Riots are often caused by

peasants and members of the working class who are suppressed by local CCP members,

as well as by high-level authority figures in Beijing. Most peasants benefit little from the

market economy and endure many hardships trying to maintain a living. Since 1987,

elections have been carried out in local villages and townships in an effort to quell social

unrest. The CCP claims to be moving China toward democracy, but this is a bogus

assertion, as the village and township elections are closely monitored by state officials.

Although by means of polling techniques officials in the West are aware of public

attitudes, surveys are conducted to ensure that candidates and officials are mindful of

public views, not to root out dissent and punish challengers to the regime.

On March 2009, Wu Bangguo, the chairman of China's National People's

Congress, underscored the rejection of Western-style democracy by China's fourth

generation of communist leadership. He boldly asserted that, "China would never adopt a

multiparty political system, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature or an

"Elizabeth Economy, "Don't Break the Engagement," Foreign Affairs (May/ June 2004),
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independent judiciary.T'" Wu's remarks not only repudiated hope that China would

liberalize along Western lines, but also claimed that the one-party authoritarian system

61

was vastly superior to democracy.

Wu argued that, "without a single Communist Party

62

in control China 'would be torn by strife and incapable of accomplishing anything."'

Wu declared that Western-style democracy is not suited to China, and that the Chinese

people would not be able to handle a multiparty system. The Chinese understanding of

democracy is based on "popular support for the powerful government rather than

63

individual rights, diverse social interests and limited government. "

The CCP constantly

reminds its citizens that Western democracy will not be adopted in China, so that the

people will accept the one-party system as the only option for China's political future.

Confucianism and Democracy

The long history of Confucianism in China also is a big factor in Chinese

misunderstandings of the basic fundamentals of democracy. Since Confucian ideology is

based on authority, discipline, limited individual freedom, and the strength of the state,

"authoritarian regimes restrictive of human rights are looking to an Asian model of

64

development based on Confucianism rather than the West."

In China, the government

disregards the Western concept of human rights, which was adopted by the United

Nations, and instead bases its values on Confucian sentiments. Confucian teachings are
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65

not founded on personal individuality or personal property,

but on the interdependency

66

of fathers and elder brothers.

"The learning of Confucianism has tended to be

67

oppressive and to promote male selfishness. "

Although Confucianism was vigorously

attacked during the Mao period, Confucian behavior was characteristic of Mao himself.

It is fair to assume then, that the middle class in China has derived much of its

moral outlook from enduring Confucian ethics, and thus depends on the government in

many ways, including for the provision of jobs and insurance of social stability. The

Chinese government bases its actions on Confucian hierarchical order as well, in part by

not giving its people liberal freedoms or a sense of individual rights. On the contrary, it

controls its citizens by restricting their liberties, and makes great effort to cause the

people to be dependent on the government. For example, private entrepreneurs need to

surrender a certain amount of income to local officials, otherwise they cannot obtain bank

loans. Educated middle-class citizens who are graduating from universities often are not

able to earn a decent income unless the government places them into jobs. The lack of

personal property is also derived from Confucianism.

illlllllllfAillllliii

. ' The land is owned by the government.

There have been many instances when the government has taken away homes and land

for new construction, and the affected people are given unfair compensation. Although

the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by United Nations member
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countries all over the world, the enduring Confucian attitudes do not support the concepts

68

of universal human rights and freedoms; rather, they lean toward authoritarianism.
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Chapter3

Pro-Democracy Movements in China:

Call for Political Liberalization or for Fulfillment of Individual Needs?

Along with Cuba, North Korea, and Vietnam, China continues to be ruled as a one-party

state. Beginning in the late 1970s, student movements grew into the so called "pro

democracy" movement in China. In the 1980s, there were several student demonstrations,

but none of them called for the Western-style concept of democracy. The Tiananmen

Square protest movement of 1989 made headlines across the world when the Chinese

government used military force to suppress this movement, killing hundreds, some say

thousands, of demonstrators. Persons in the West believed that the students and the

workers died in the name of democracy. The Western press and many Chinese citizens

claimed that the events that took place in the spring of 1989 were a step toward

democracy for China. In truth, the students demanded attention from the government to

matters that would fulfill their individual needs.

Why the Students Demonstrated

Since 1978, China has experienced rapid economic growth. The open-door policy has

been a route toward national modernization and has provided hope for a better future in

China. During the forty years prior to 1989, communist rule frequently had condemned

intellectuals, and now the educated, growing middle class had the opportunity to become

22

interested in moral absolutes and political rights.' The students involved in the1989

demonstrations came from various walks oflife. Some emerged from poverty-stricken

areas, and some came from prestigious institutions of higher learning in China. All of the

students had been trained in an educational system that required memorization rather than

2

creative thinking and analysis of text material.

Most students, if not all, had very little

experience with Western translations and political ideas. The only newspapers to which

they had been exposed were those that were channels of government propaganda; works

of Western-style democracies were strictly forbidden by the CCP.

In early 1989, the media began reporting that "doctors and university graduates

earned less than cab drivers, and hairdressers, and that everyone earned less than private

entrepreneurs." The students felt that they were entitled to a better life, and wanted the

government to provide benefits to them such as good jobs, travel abroad, and all the other

4

privileges that the CCP had to offer.

During the 1986-1987 demonstrations, students had

held banners for freedom and democracy, but when asked to elaborate, they had

5

complained about government corruption, uncomfortable dormitories, and poor food.

The slogans attacking high-level officials for corruption, calling for a free press and

advocating democracy and freedom, symbolized an open political process for self-serving

6

elite.

Students focused on their own individual needs rather than on the common good

for the whole country. They challenged the government to compromise, to give them
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7

what they wanted, so they could go back to the classroom and abandon their movement.

Although the demonstrators carried slogans that called for democracy and freedom of the

press, in reality, they did not demand fundamental change within the government. Instead,

students wanted change that addressed their personal needs. They were dissatisfied with

living conditions on campus, and, what seemingly was most important, they wanted a

guaranteed lifetime job that came with the benefits of being a CCP member. They were

aware of the competition among the educated elite class, and were terrified of ending up

with a job that did not live up to their expectations. As rewards for their academic work

and achievements, the students expected guaranteed government jobs, good housing, and

privileges that ordinary citizens of China do not have. They held aloft democratic slogans,

but these terms were aimed at expanding their own rights and opportunities. They were

not concerned with unfair treatment of peasants or workers, and they did not raise

concerns about broad abuses by their government of human rights and religious and other

freedoms. In fact, the students approached their movement in elitist and non-egalitarian

8

terms.

During the protests of 1986-1987 and 1989, the students did not call for the rule

oflaw. The ideology behind the protests was of the educated elite, of which the students

were part. The main theme of the demonstrations and their posters "was not that the CCP

should be more responsive to the ideas of China's masses but rather that it should allow

9

the intelligentsia a greater voice in national affairs. "

During the demonstrations, students

in Fujian Province were shocked, even horrified, that true popular elections would have

to include all classes in China, peasants and workers as well as the educated elite. At first,
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the students and intellectuals were ambivalent about the lower classes joining their

movement.l'' The students wanted the government to meet their demands, not those of the

workers.

As the movement gained popular support, however, the demonstrators began to

11

consider the benefits of increasing the number of people in their movement.

They

recruited members of the lower classes to join their demonstrations so that the mass

movement would be larger, and, therefore, the media, the people, and, most of all, the

government would take the protests seriously and perhaps negotiate with the students to

give them what they wanted. However, the students pursued their own individual needs,

ignoring the plight of the workers.

The workers could see that participation was being strictly restricted to
students themselves, as if the workers were not qualified to participate.
And from the news on television, accusing workers of spreading rumors
etc., it seemed that workers were being specifically targeted by the
authorities. They could see the sentences imposed against working-class
people were particularly heavy. Moreover, in Beijing the issues that the
students raised had nothing to do with the workers. For example, Wuer
Kaixi in his speeches only talked about the students [Wuer Kaixi and other
student representatives' dialogue with Li Peng was broadcast nationwide
on television]. Ifhe had mentioned the workers as well, appealed to them
in a sincere manner, the workers might really have come out in a major
12

way.

Fuzhou students seemed concerned with their own economic situation. They

feared a drop in their living standard. They also believed that American teachers were the
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13

most highly paid, and that in China teachers made less than peasants.

These ideas about

Western standards ofliving and their own relative positions in Chinese society prompted

the students to protest against government officials. The students believed that they were

14

being abused by the one-party state.

They wanted the government to recognize their

movement and to understand their frustration. They believed that the government of

China had let them down. "The solid political career that they believed entry to a

15

university guaranteed them had been snatched away."

Other people who had been

affected by the corrupt government sided with the students by reading their banners and

16

applauding them.

The spring 1989 demonstrations by Beijing students encouraged economic reform

17

and liberalization.

The hunger strike by some three thousand students soon gained the

support of thousands of citizens in China, including workers, who demanded a response

from the government. First, the government tried to wait out the hunger strike, hoping

that the students would become bored and return to their classrooms. On May 18, Premier

Li Peng engaged in limited communication with the students, as he believed that it was

inappropriate to discuss the students' demands. The following day, Zhao Ziyang, general

secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, and Li Peng went to Tiananmen Square,

where Zhao begged the students to end their demonstrations. Failing to get the

demonstrators to end their protests, on May 20, Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun
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announced that martial law would be used to end what the China's leaders claimed was

chaos in Tiananmen Square. What started as a peaceful demonstration by unarmed

students ended in bloodshed on June 4, when the PLA opened fire on the protestors. The

Chinese government received detailed documentation on an hourly basis from security

ministries and foreign and counter intelligences, whose work included gathering

additional information from the CCP's Propaganda and United Front Work departments,

18

State Education Commission, and various cabinet-level ministries.

The party officials

had information on the state of mind of the students, workers, farmers, and all others

19

around the country.

These documents were strictly confidential, and the CCP gathered

them together to make decisions on the situation in Tiananmen Square.

The use of martial law against the protestors showed to the people of China, as

well as to foreigners, the ugly nature of the authoritarian regime. If the CCP had voted to

pursue a dialogue with the students rather than to use military force, relations with the

West would have been smoother, and there might have been hope for China to lean

toward democracy at some point. Instead, the West and the people of China were quickly

reminded of the brutal nature of the Chinese government, and any hope for political

liberalization faded away quickly.

Response from the CCP

The 1989 demonstrations were by students who were angry with their government

because it did not provide guarantees to them for life. The economic reform in China that

was proposed by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 had provided an opportunity for China and the

18
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West to prosper economically. However, in the 1980s, journalists and economists

reported many incidents of intellectuals' lacking jobs, and the job market was becoming

competitive. This meant that the students were not assured positions. The students had

wanted to discuss conditions with which they were not satisfied. They demanded

dialogue to urge the government to recognize: "(I) the impact and nature of the student

movement, (2) ways to strengthen reform, and (3) article 35 of the Constitution, which

guaranteed freedom of expression, publication, association, and the right to

20

demonstrate. "

The students believed that, despite their effort to initiate talks with

21

government officials, it would be unlikely that authorities would meet with them.

The

decision of June 4, 1989, to clear the square and end the student movement, showed how

the Chinese government is very willing to disregard the human and civil rights of its own

people. Both the students and the CCP "pushed each other's buttons" until the end, so that

compromise on either side became less and less an option.

On April 1 5 , 1989, the former secretary general of the CCP, Hu Yaobang, had

died. Most students had grieved his death in a peaceful manner, respecting and

22

acknowledging his former leadership of the party.

On April 25, Deng Xiaoping had

realized the possible consequences of the student demonstrations and concluded that the

participants were seeking to create chaos within society through an attempt to overthrow

23

the Chinese government.

Deng then stated, "We must not be afraid of people cursing at

us, of a bad reputation, or of international reaction. Only if China develops, and
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implements the four modernizations [of agriculture, industry, science and technology,

and national defense], can we have a real reputation.t''" The decision makers planned to

use force against the protesters, if necessary; risk of a bad international image did not

play a role. Loss of foreign investments was not as important, either, as the possibility of

the overthrow of the CCP-led government. According to the "Tiananmen Papers,"

presented by Andrew Nathan in Foreign Affairs in the winter of 2001, on April 26, 1989,

Deng Xiaoping was furious with the uncontrollable students, and was ready to clear the

mass movement from Tiananmen Square. He complained:

This is no ordinary student movement. The students have been raising a
ruckus for ten days now, and we've been tolerant and restrained. But
things haven't gone our way. A tiny minority is exploiting the students;
they want to confuse the people and throw the country into chaos. This is a
well-planned plot whose real aim is to reject the Chinese Communist Party
and the socialist system at the most fundamental level. We must explain to
the whole Party and nation that we are facing a most serious political
struggle. We've got to be explicit and clear in opposing this turmoil.25

According to Deng Xiaoping, the students were rejecting the Chinese government, and

were trying to disturb society by turning the people against their own government. He

wanted to end what he considered to be public chaos, despite the consequences of a loss

of foreign investment and Chinese authorities' bad international image owed to their

abuse of human rights. However, Deng and the government officials who sided with him

wanted to clear Tiananmen Square prior to the arrival of the Soviet Union President

Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev's visit was intended to highlight Deng's achievements in
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foreign policy.26 Gorbachev and Deng were supposed to discuss the withdrawal of Soviet

troops from Afghanistan, Soviet support for the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia,

and Sino-Soviet efforts to improve relations between mainland China and Taiwan.27 In

Deng's eyes, the students had badly disrupted China's meeting with the leader of the

Soviet Union.

Tiananmen Square was inaccessible, therefore, the usual welcoming

ceremony could not take place in the Forbidden City.28 Foreign media coverage focused

on the student protesters rather than on the arrival of Gorbachev and China's improved

9

relations with the Soviet Union.2

Following Gorbachev's visit, when further efforts failed to convince the students to

leave Tiananmen Square, the government imposed martial law to suppress the

demonstrations.l" Martial law had never been imposed in Beijing before, but to the CCP,

it seemed like the only solution to end the demonstrations. Two months before, martial

law had been declared in the Tibetan city, Lhasa, to suppress ethnic riots, leading to

bloodshed.31 Yet, the protesters at Tiananmen Square underestimated the brutality of the

CCP leaders and their military force. Prior to June 4, 1989, the students could only

speculate about the potential costs of demonstrating against the government.

32

What the

students did not realize, was that their authoritarian government would use military force

against their mass movement, as it leaders viewed the demonstrations as a threat to the

communist regime. On the morning of June 2, 1989, party elders Deng Xiaoping, Li
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Xiannian, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Bo Yibo, and Wang Zhen met with the Standing

Committee of the Politburo to discuss the final actions to be taken against the student

33

protesters.

Some party elders were more passionate about using military force than

others. During the meeting, Wang Zhen prodded his comrades as follows:

Those goddamn bastards! Who do they think they are, trampling on sacred
ground like Tiananmen so long?! They're really asking for it! We should
send the troops right now to grab those counterrevolutionaries, Comrade
Xiaoping! What's the People's Liberation Army for, anyway? What are
martial law troops for? They're not supposed to just sit around and eat!
They're supposed to grab counterrevolutionaries! We've got to do it or
we'll never forgive ourselves! We've got to do it or the common people
will rebel! Anybody who tries to overthrow the Communist Party deserves
34

death and no burial!

The Tiananmen Square Crackdown of 1989

On June 4, 1989, the troops began to move eastward toward Tiananmen Square. At 9:30

p.m., the People's Liberation Army began to fire tear gas and rubber bullets into the

35

crowd.

The troops fired warning shots, but the crowd failed to respond, showing no

36

signs of fear that the military would use live ammunition.

However, at approximately

37

10:30 p.m., the troops opened fue against the protestors.

Killings of both the students

and soldiers continued throughout the night. By 5:40 a.m., Tiananmen Square had been

38

cleared, leaving thousands killed or injured.

The exact number of people killed and injured during the massacre is unknown,

because foreign journalists were not allowed to take pictures or otherwise document
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events. However, observers said that Beijing looked as though it had been engaged in war,

with plumes of smoke rising into the air and burned-out military vehicles and buses in

view. The government took major action on June 4, as it feared that the large crowds of

student, intellectuals, and workers in Beijing and in other cities might topple the regime.

"The events of 1989 left the regime positioned for its responses to later challenges,

such as the Chinese Democratic Party in 1998-99 and the Falun Gong religious

39

movement since 1999."

Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, the party has

been harsh on independent groups that it has suspected of opposing the government. Also,

any mass movement, whether of a religious, student, farmer, or worker group without

party members as constituents, has been quickly crushed.

The Chinese government has feared being overthrown by a large mass movement

because it was witness to what happened in Eastern European countries. In February

1989, a large mass movement in Poland, with the help of the Catholic Church and Pope

John Paul II, overthrew the communist regime, and helped Poland to transition into

democracy. On June 4, 1989, when Chinese authorities cracked down on citizens in

Tiananmen Square, Poland was holding its first parliamentary elections since the end of

4

the Second World War.

°

Chinese officials also witnessed General Wojciech Jaruzelski's

41

use of martial law against the anti-communist mass movement in Poland.

The Chinese

government thought that the protests in Beijing were growing beyond the party's control,

and therefore used Jaruzelski's tactics to suppress the Tiananmen Square demonstrations
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42

before it was too late.

After the June 4 massacre in Beijing, the party-controlled

newspaper observed, "The suppression of students, workers, and citizens, and the

arbitrary apprehension of political offenders under the martial law would only end in

43

acknowledging the people's strength, and conducting dialogues with the people. "

China after the Tiananmen Massacre

After the events of the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese leaders held no regrets. They

were convinced that they had done what was necessary to end the demonstrations in

Tiananmen Square that they were convinced threatened the regime. By imposing martial

law on May 20 and opening fire against the demonstrators on June 4, the central

government had given a stem warning to the students and their sympathizers not to repeat

such protests, as the consequences would be severe. Among Chinese officials, there was a

deep sense of "We told you so.',44 Chinese leaders justified their actions and placed the

blame on the students, claiming that if the demonstrators had listened, the crackdown

would not have taken place.

There was deep fear among the people of China. The government hunted the

demonstrators. Many protesters were jailed, and even given death sentences. The people

of China and around the globe were now keenly aware that the Chinese government was

willing to suppress any mass movement that was critical ofit. The events of June 4, 1989,

showed the true colors of the Chinese central government. Neither foreign investments,

nor the human rights of the Chinese people, nor a bad international image played a role
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when the eight CCP elders made the decision to use military force against the students.

Following the crackdown, Deng Xiaoping's economic reform program was challenged by

conservatives in China, who believed that China's opening to the West had led to

challenges against the CCP and against the Chinese communist system, in general.

However, Deng and many other leaders realized that the continued economic

development of China was the best hope for the party's retention of control of power.

Economic Development and Political Liberalization in China

The assumption among Westerners that economic reform in China would lead to political

liberalization of its government, proved to be false. It also proved erroneous that the

educated middle class would demand democracy as it accumulated more influence in

society. Since the Tiananmen Square massacre, continued economic development has not

Jed to political liberalization; rather, the CCP has suppressed any organization or

movement that it deems capable of opposing the government. Moreover, the so-called

democracy movement in China all but vanished after the massacre. The demonstrations

had not been in support of Western-style democracy, but instead were an effort to

convince the government that the individual needs of the protestors should be fulfilled.

As previously noted, the students had a very poor understanding of democracy. Lack of

jobs was a concern and the demand for secure positions following graduation was a

significant motivation for the demonstrations. The students did not want to have to

compete for jobs, nor did they want jobs that would not be commensurate with their

educational backgrounds.
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In a democratic country, people are allowed to protest if they are not satisfied

with their government, because each citizen has the right to publicly express an opinion.

A good government protects its citizens from harm, and does not use military force

against its people, because it honors the rights and freedoms of individuals, which include

the freedom and right to express one's views.

Although the student protesters were not calling for democracy and the end to the

CCP-led government, the CCP nevertheless used martial law and military force to

terminate the demonstrations at Tiananmen Square. Thus, regardless of the demands of

the protesters, the Tiananrnen massacre showed the absence of tolerance among top

authorities in China for confrontation regarding their rule. Following June 4, 1989, the

educated middle class has focused its attention on the accumulation of wealth and shown

no inclination to be a catalyst to move China toward democracy. Not only do members of

the middle class have a vague understanding of Western-style democracy, but also there

is no apparent desire or solidarity among them that would erupt in a political challenge to

the one-party state. Every group since 1989 that has engaged in protest has done so in

concern for its own interests, and there has been no consolidation of their efforts for the

purpose of establishing a democracy.
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Chapter4

The Rising Middle Class:

China's Hope for Democratization, or Agent for Preserving the Political Status Quo?

Since Deng Xiaoping's 1978 open-door reforms, new social groups have emerged in

China to form an emerging middle class. This arising middle class includes people in

occupations and professions resulting from the open-door policy and China's rapid

economic growth. The middle class embraces contract-based managers of state

enterprises, professors, senior scientists, stock brokers, real-estate agents, senior

employees in major banks and other financial institutions, managers of private and

1

foreign companies, lawyers, singers, athletes, fashion models, designers, and others.

It

also includes scientific and technical development entrepreneurs, the Chinese

management staff of foreign enterprises located in China, the middle and senior

management staff of state-owned financial enterprises, and some owners of private

2

enterprises.

The past decade has seen the rise of something Mao sought to stamp out
forever: a Chinese middle class now estimated to number between 100
million and 150 million people. Though definitions vary-household
income of at least $10,000 a year is one standard-middle-class families
tend to own an apartment and a car, to eat out and take vacations, and to
be familiar with foreign brands and ideas. They owe their well-being to
3

the government's economic policies.

I

David S.G. Goodman, ed., The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present Lives (New York: Routledge
Taylor and Francis Group, 2008), 1 .
2

"Five Kinds of People Seen as Middle Class of China," China Business Daily News, February 1 1 , 2003,
http://proquest.urni.com.ezproxy .shu.edu/pqdweb?did=2904374 l l &sid=2&Fmt=3&clientld=517 l&RQT=
309&VName=PQD (accessed February 26, 2009).
3

Lisa T. Chang, "China's Middle Class," National Geographic, May 2008, http://ngm.nationalgeographic.
com/2008/05/china/middle-class/leslie-chang-text.html (accessed March 4, 2009).

36

The Middle Class and the CCP

Life is good for an average middle-class family in China. Many own cars, housing, and

have a decent income to maintain a high living standard.

According to Xinhua News, in

2007, an estimated 6 . 1 5 percent of China's population, which is about 80 million, were

making about 60,000 to 500,000 yuan as an annual income. In urban areas, an average

person made 11,759 yuan, in contrast to rural citizens whose yearly average income was

4

3,587 yuan.

The wealthy in China are regarded as the middle class, which differentiates

them from the middle class in the Western world. Today, China's wealthy middle class is

5

estimated to be about 8 percent of the entire population.

Since China is one of the largest economic powers in the world, there has been

speculation that modernization in China and the rising middle class might follow Western

footsteps toward forcing democratization, and that the wealth of the middle class might

be the key to China's political stability. For decades, however, China has failed to

liberalize politically and its modernization has weakened the Chinese people's desire to

resist the authoritarian government. Presently, the Chinese government provides state

employment for the state functionaries and professionals. According to David Goodman,

a professor at the University of Sydney, the "Chinese middle class is largely the creature,

though not wholly intentionally, of the ruling communist party rather than the fruit of an

upwelling of economic autonomy or free thinking.i"
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16.

In Western countries, the middle class was created by the process of

7

industrialization and derived its income from services and management that it provided.

The middle class produced managerial and professional occupations, which were not

controlled by the state. As industrialization deepened, the state became more complex,

8

creating more jobs and stabilizing society.

Unlike Western societies in which the middle

class emerged, China's middle class keeps a close relationship with the Communist

9

Party.

Goodman says, "Where new entrepreneurs did not already participate formally in

the activities of the party-state, particularly at leadership levels, they have now found

themselves fully incorporated; and many new entrepreneurs would appear to depend on

10

family networks of influence grounded in the party-state."

The middle class in China builds networks of family influence, so that when

members retire, their children can take over the business, "building on the local

relationships and networks of influence that their parents have developed.t''! The private

entrepreneurs are associated with social, economic, and political influence in China. As

their business grows and they wish to expand their production or take a bank loan, a

private entrepreneur must give part of his equity to the local government, otherwise he

12

will not be allowed to build his businesses or take a loan.

Without a close relationship

to the government, private entrepreneurs would not be able to run or increase their

businesses enterprises. They are dependent on the government to become wealthier, and
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to build a network of influence that will help them to increase their income. The private

entrepreneurs' initiative promotes individual economic growth as well as wealth for

13

China.

Industrialization and economic development among the middle class has not

ensured liberal democracy in China, however; rather, it has promoted government

corruption and economic wealth within the self-serving middle class.

As private entrepreneurs are becoming wealthy with the help of the CCP-led

government, the peasants in the countryside are faced with fees, taxes, and takeovers of

14

land with unfair compensation.

These factors often cause the peasants and the urban

workers to protest and riot. Although the peasants and workers are frustrated with unfair

treatment by the Chinese government, often they feel powerless against the CCP.

Members of the middle class do not oppose the CCP, however, as long as they are

guaranteed employment and the government satisfies their individual needs. The living

standards of the middle class continue to improve, and its members usually can afford

luxuries, including plasma TVs, washing machines, and other items that most Westerners

can enjoy. Middle-class citizens usually hold steady jobs that have been guaranteed by

the government. If they are CCP members, the government provides housing and other

benefits to them.
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The Non-Privileged Class

In 2009, it is estimated that more than 80 million peasants live in poverty, and most of

15

them earn less than $100 per year.

As noted, conditions in China's rural areas are more

harsh than in urban centers. Oppressive taxes cause disputes in local villages. From the

1980s through the present, the Chinese government has forced various taxes on villagers,

such as education taxes, taxes for marriage and burial, and taxes for sterilization or

16

having a baby.

At times, the taxes have been simply described as land fees or poll

17

taxes.

Local officials also tax the peasants for delivering letters and for electricity and

18

water conservancy.

If the peasants are unable to pay these taxes, their belongings are

being taken away from them.

The widening gap between the rich and the poor increasingly has caused the

peasants to rebel against the government's corruption. In 1998 and 1999, peasant riots

occurred in Hunan Province. In Qiyang County, the police opened fire on I 0,000 people

19

who protested in front of the Chinese government's headquarters.

Another

demonstration by local farmers in Daolin led police to use a tear gas canister, resulting in

one death and the injury of about a hundred farmers." The local group known as the

Society for Reducing Taxes and Saving the Nation organized the protest in Daolin, and

its leaders were arrested. In the same year, about a hundred farmers from Guoyuan
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21
village in Jiangsu Province protested against high taxes.

Given the strong-willed nature

of the CCP, the government used police force, and about thirty peasants were injured and

ten were taken into custody. Riots also took place in Qidong, Wenfushi, Dazhongqiao,

22

Luodi, Xingqi, Xupu, and Xizhang.

In many cases, it is China's dysfunctional taxation system that has caused

peasants to rebel. In Zizhou Province, 12,688 farmers filed a law suit against local

officials for collecting 25 percent of their annual income and beating the farmers who

23
were unable to pay the taxes due to drought or crop failure.

The court found the fees to

be unfair, but no action was taken against the corrupt officials. Indeed, the taxes collected

from the peasants frequently are used to pay government employees' salaries and

4

bonuses.2

In 2002, the annual fees collected from the peasants were estimated at I .I

billion yuan, which averages to 100 yuan per peasant." In 2004, it was estimated that in

Liaoning Province, each peasant had to pay 43.5 percent of his annual income to the CCP

26
government.

Yet, in China, the law states that each household should contribute no

more than 5 percent of its income for taxes. Additional imposed fees include private

political projects and other mandates for higher government officials.

The protests have been increasing in China since the 1990s. "The nation saw

87,000 'public disturbances' in 2005, a euphemism for riots and uprisings.v'" Since the

21
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1998 and 1999 demonstrations in Hunan Province, where thousands of peasants

demonstrated and left many injured, the CCP has not improved living standards or unfair

taxation in the rural areas. In March 2007, twenty thousand farmers in Hunan Province

clashed with one thousand police armed with guns, protesting against the government's

corruption and unfair taxation that leaves them to struggle to provide basic needs for

28

themselves and their families.

The economic reform efforts begun by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 have improved the

standard ofliving in China, in general, owed to a GDP growth rate of I O . I percent

29

between 1981 and 1990, and 1 1 . 6 percent from 1991 through 1995.

However, the

reforms also changed China's industrial structure. State-owned enterprises have declined,

and private, foreign, and collective investments have grown tremendously. In 2000, 70

million peasants moved from villages to the urban areas and found long-term jobs in

30

state-owned enterprises.

In the same year, the estimated total number of workers in

31

China was about 350 million.

Between 1998 and 2002, however, 27 million people

32

were laid off from state-owned enterprises.

The situation was tense and created riots.

There were many incidents such as the one April 1999, in the northeastern city of Fushun,

33

when 4,000 unpaid workers blocked the railroad, disrupting the service.

It was
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estimated that about 3 million workers were involved in protests that year.

Workers not

only were losing jobs but also retirement pensions and medical benefits were being taken

away. In Anhui Province, ten thousand workers protested due to the lack of medical

35

insurance and injury compensation.

Due to the economic recession of2008-2009, more

workers in China have protested as a result of diminished compensation and layoffs. In

December 2008, hundreds of workers gathered outside a Shanghai electrical components

36

factory to demand reasonable pay and working conditions.

Of approximately 130

million migrant workers in China, the recent global economic turndown has led over 20

37

million migrant workers to lose their jobs.

By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, rural and urban lands were owned

the government sells the land to developers for new construction projects and forces

villagers to evacuate. People then have to depend on the compensation that is given to

them by the government. Compensation is usually unreasonably low, and people who

have built these houses themselves through hard work, must leave. Forced takeovers of

34
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land by the government caused about 800,000 demonstrations across mainland China in

40

2005.

In that same year, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences reported that 40

million farmers had lost their land, and the number was increasing by 2 million

41

annually.

The land where farmers once grew rice and vegetables is being converted into

urban constructions sites. In 2001, in the Wuhu district on Chengdu's west side, the local

42

government offered farmers compensation for their homes and fields.

They were

offered $2,200 for one-sixth of an acre, an amount equal to what people pay for fifty

square feet in a new apartment.

Many villagers refused to take the compensation, so the

43

government cut off their water and electricity, and then damaged their property.

Many

villagers refuse to leave their homes, and protested to the authorities in Beijing. On

September 17, 2007, the villagers from the Wuhu district were imprisoned, beaten, and

44

forced to admit that they had broken the law.

Although villagers are victims of forced land takeovers, and workers are losing

medical and retirement benefits, when workers and the farmers protest against unfair

treatment, the protests are not to overthrow the CCP, or to demand democracy. Once

again, protests lodged against China's officials are based on the government's not

meeting individual needs.
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The Failure of the Middle Class to Prompt Political Liberalization

Former President Bill Clinton believed in China's ability to politically liberalize and to

create government stability through globalization. In his 2000 speech at Vietnam

National University in Hanoi, he stated, "Globalization is not something we can hold off

or turn off. It is the economic equivalent of a force of nature like wind or water. ,,4s Like

many, Bill Clinton believed that positive aspects of globalization would lead the Chinese

government toward political liberalization.

Since 1978, trade between the West and China has permitted China to grow

militarily and economically, in part by allowing it to industrialize extensively. However,

China's role in globalization has not promoted domestic political stability in the PRC, nor

has the emerging middle class guaranteed steps toward Western-style democracy. In fact,

through economic reform, the Chinese government has been able to exploit China's

population, exposing laborers to harsh working conditions and paying them unfair

46

wages.

Many observers of China have speculated that appreciation of human rights and

political liberalization might arise in the PRC when the educated middle class became

47

politically informed and put their high salaries to good use.

Optimists held that Chinese

children would gain a good education and better jobs, become better citizens, and gain

rights as well as the freedom to organize themselves to challenge the authoritarian

48

government and turn China into a democracy.
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According to statistics in 2009, however,

the growth of the middle class is not as rapid as predicted in the 1990s, when the growth

rate of the economy in China was at its highest peak.

The 2008-2009 global economic crisis is having a profound effect in China.

It is

estimated in 2009 that about 20 million Chinese migrant workers are returning to their

49

home villages, because millions of factory positions have been eliminated.

"The crisis

puts in peril the government's efforts to lift hundreds of millions of peasants out of

poverty and to close the staggering gap between the country's urban rich and rural

50

poor."

Since many workers are left jobless, and independent trade unions are banned in

China, many workers have resorted to rioting. Uneducated workers have no skills and

cannot explore other career options. They cannot turn to their government for help, and

51

out of desperation they organize mass movements.

So far, these demonstrations have

been quickly brought under the government's control, and have not exhibited the

characteristics of a democracy movement.

Economic Crisis 2008-2009 and the Impact on China

The current economic crisis has created serious financial concerns. "It is not long ago that

China was introducing measures to cool down an economy that grew by 1 1 . 9 % last year.

But that figure fell to just 9% in the third quarter of this year [2008] due to a slowing of

52

export and investment growth."

The Chinese government has given companies a
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$958bn stimulus package to avoid further economic slowdown.

Despite the bailout

money, factories still are closing and workers have unified to demonstrate against the

massive layoffs caused by the global crisis. As these workers are often uneducated and

unskilled, many accept poor labor conditions, minimal rights, and unfair payroll

compensation. All they want from the government is to get their jobs back, so that they

can support their families.

Since the West has been hit with the economic crisis, its publics cannot afford to

buy products from China at previous levels. Consequently, in November 2008 it was

reported that, the wages of workers in Guangdong province have been cut by

II
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1111.

Nonetheless, the Chinese government is not as worried about the massive

layoffs of blue-collar workers as they are of the white-collar middle class. The middle

class in China consists of some I 00 to 150 million citizens who are accustomed to having

more choices and a higher standard of living than the average Chinese:

For China's emerging middle class, this is an age of aspiration-but also a
time of anxiety. Opportunities have multiplied, but each one brings
pressure to take part and not lose out, and every acquisition seems to come
ready-wrapped in disappointment that it isn't something newer and better.
An apartment that was renovated a few years ago looks dated; a mobile

phone without a video camera and color screen is an embarrassment.
Classes in colloquial English are fashionable among Shanghai
55

schoolchildren, but everything costs money.

The Chinese government is aware that China's middle class wants to maintain a

certain living standard, and the memory of the 1989 protests reminds it that its very
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survival may be based on keeping the middle class happy. China's officials fear that

increasing unemployment might lead to another eruption of social instability, which

56

could be hard to control.

To avoid social turmoil, the Chinese government now provides

57

unemployment benefits and social security wages to the middle class.

If the Chinese

economy starts to crumble, however, jobs would become more scarce and the standard of

living among members of the middle class could decrease tremendously. Especially since

the global economic downturn, there have been massive lay-offs from state-owned

enterprises, compounding the previous hardships of the loss of medical health benefits

58

and retirement pensions.

There is little on which to base speculation that the emerging middle class will

lead China toward political stability, and, eventually, democracy. Although the current

economic crisis could lead to middle-class discontent, and once again, the middle class

might unfurl slogans of democracy and freedom, its basic demands would likely be for

financial stability and fulfillment of its consumer expectations. The middle class seeks

money and government benefits rather than basic fundamental changes to the one-party

system. Given the I 00 to 150 million people who are in the middle class, their deep

dissatisfaction could be problematic for the central government. Yet, there is no

indication that this stratum of society wants to overturn the CCP-led authoritarian state.

The middle class is in a far better position than the workers who have lost jobs and are

forced to return to their rural areas. Indeed, the government is still most concerned with

members of middle class, giving them unemployment and retirement benefits to avoid
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unrest. If the middle class were to organize demonstrations, it likely would be to demand

that the government meet their own needs. They would seek freedom for themselves and

protest against government corruption, as during the 1989 protests, while their

understanding of Western-style democracy remained very vague. The citizens of China

along with the Chinese government "define democracy in its own terms, drawing ideas of

good government with deep roots in the nation's historical culture and more recent roots

in its ideology of socialism.r'" It is not likely that the middle class would care that the

workers are in a far worse situation due to the economic crisis, or about abuse of the

human rights of other citizen of China practiced by the government. "The educated elite

60

view the rest of the population as illiterate, backward, and superstitious."

As evidenced by the cruel nature of its actions in the 1989 crackdown, however,

the central government fears that the emerging middle class will lodge protests against it

if their expected living standards are not achieved. That is why state officials are doing

whatever they can to keep the middle class happy, and trying to keep its members away

from the political arena.

Reluctant to cut loose all state enterprises to market competition and
create a huge new wave of unemployment, the government instead has set
strict production and price controls. It is throwing money into new job
creating infrastructure projects and is taking measures-like lowering
61

interest rates-to encourage people to spend their money.

The government is looking out for members of the middle class during the global

crisis, by providing unemployment benefits to them and by cutting interest rates so that
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they will spend more money and be able to maintain a high living standard. It is creating

new jobs, in part by building new infrastructure projects which often take away land from

the farmers. Premier Wen Jiaobao said that he" hoped to create nine million new jobs in

62

the cities and increase local government spending budgets by almost 25%."

The

government stimulus package to create new jobs is especially aimed at satisfying the

middle class, for "when people cannot get jobs they may start to question why the

63

Communist Party should stay in power. "

Status and Power of the Middle Class

The nature of the Chinese government is to do what it takes to maintain control of the

state and to stay in power. The government's focus, as noted, is on investment in new

companies to create jobs for the middle class. Premier Wen and the Communist Party

strongly believe that projects to build new infrastructure will help the economy, create

political stability, and avoid social turmoil. "In China, a developing country with a

population of 1.3 billion, maintaining a certain growth rate for the economy is essential

for expanding employment for urban and rural residents, increasing people's incomes and

64

ensuring social stability."

Only a portion of the stimulus bill will be used for

construction of railways and roads, which might create temporary jobs for the lower class.

China's middle class, or zhong chan, is a strong force that could have a significant

impact on China's politics, and society as a whole. It is not an ordinary middle class,

however, as viewed in the West. China historically viewed itself very selfishly as the
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"middle kingdom," ignoring other societies as grossly inferior. Similarly, today the

middle class views itself as superior and more deserving than the lower classes of

Chinese society. Edward Friedman asserts that the Chinese government "would reject

democracy as an alien plot that would empower China's lesser-quality people of the

65

center, thereby splitting the nation and ending its rapid rise. "

Given the fact that the

middle class views itself elite, the Chinese government cannot afford to lose its support,

especially because, "based on an annual growth of one percentage point, the 'middle

class' people in China are expected to make up 40 per cent of the total population in

66

2020."

If the government were to fail to provide a high living standard to the middle

class, the legitimacy of the CCP-led government would be badly eroded. This concern

helps to explain why stores featuring luxury brands such as Gucci, Christian Dior, and

Chanel have begun to appear in more and more Chinese cities. The average middle class

in the West cannot afford to buy designer brands which cost thousands of dollars. In

China, the middle class is well-off compared to most of China's society, and until the

global economic downturn, the number of its members kept growing. Focus on its own

comforts, the middle class has no interest in demanding broad civil and political rights for

all social classes, because it benefits from the existing political system. The government

sides with the middle class, because it is the source if continued economic growth which

is essential to the CCP's ability to cling to power. Thus, the middle class and the CCP

have common interests. The CCP provides the middle class with wealth and benefits, and

the middle class in return, does not oppose the government.
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Chapters

China's Lack of Religious Freedom: Reasons behind the Crackdowns

Religious freedom is an important dimension of Western-style democracy. The freedom

to worship in one's religion became internationally accepted through the adoption of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948. Article 1 8

declares,

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

China, one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council,

endorsed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by agreeing to the final declaration

1

ofit at the World Conference of Human Rights in 1993.

Although China has nominally

agreed to honor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it brazenly violates the

international Declaration on religious freedom.

The Chinese government suppresses and harasses any religious or belief group

that could pose a threat to the ruling power. Places of worship must be registered, and the

Chinese government controls religious practices, restricting the growth and activity of

2

religious groups, and overseeing the appointment of clergy.

There are only five

sanctioned religions in China: Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Protestantism, and

3

Catholicism.

For each faith, there is a government-controlled association to monitor its

I
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4

religious activities.

These associations are overseen by State Administration of Religious

5

Affairs.

Article 36 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China promises

"freedom of religious belief," but in reality, severely restricts religious freedom and

denies protection of basic rights that are upheld in the Universal Declaration of Human

Rights. The Chinese Constitution leans toward Confucian practices that promote state

interference. Based on article 36, the state can interfere in religious activities that it

defines as abnormal, meaning that it can suppress any group or organization that it claims

to be disruptive to the social order of the state. Article 36 states that,

Citizens of People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to
believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate
against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of
religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health
of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign
.
.
6
domination.

Thus, owed to qualifying language, the citizens of China are not allowed to practice their

religion freely. The Chinese government allows its citizens to practice their religious

beliefs behind closed doors or in a state-approved venue. They are not permitted to freely

proselytize their beliefs, however, and in many cases, the government spreads false

propaganda against religious groups that it deems could threaten the authoritarian regime.

Unlike in democratic societies, an atheistic state determines what are "normal" religious

4
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activities and suppresses those that it declares to be "abnormal." Thus the one-party

system violates the basic fundamentals of article 22 of the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights which declares,

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
7

religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, based on Western-style

concepts of democracy, allows people to practice their religion or belief freely in both

public and private places. Although the Chinese government assures its citizens that basic

religious freedoms as well as human rights are protected in the Chinese Constitution,

when comparing article 36 of the PRC Constitution to article 22 of the Universal

Declaration of Human Rights, it is clear to see that the Chinese government distorts the

intent of basic freedoms. In practice, China seeks consensus on human rights based on

Chinese authoritarian perspectives.

The CCP historically has been on guard to prevent religious groups from rising

outside the authority of the government and preaching against its ideology, policies, and

practices. The demand for freedom to practice one's beliefs often causes confrontation

between spiritual believers and the authoritarian government. For example, the Fulan

Gong movement was banned in July 1999, and designated as an evil cult.

8

The state

officials claimed that the Falun Gong (also known as the Falun Dafa) disturbed society,

9

and that it was harmful to the physical and mental well-being of people.

Presumably in

response to the rising influence of Falun Gong, on October 3 1 , 1999, under article 300 of

7
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8
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China's Criminal Law, the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress

10

banned all unregistered religions.

Persecution of the Falun Gong

Falun Gong is mainly an exercise group which involves breathing, and is believed to

inherit the wisdom of Buddhism, Taoism, and traditional Chinese qigong.'! In 2008, it

was estimated that the number of Falun Gong practitioners in mainland China was about

12

70 million, which was about the same number of the CCP party members.

Since

members do not consider Falun Gong a religion (knowing that there are only five

religions that are sanctioned by the government) and it has no designated places of

worship, it has been difficult for the government to supervise this group of believers.

The Falun Gong consists of members from various walks of life: peasants, middle

class professionals, professors, and even government workers. Rich and poor have been

members of the Falun Gong. The purpose of the movement was not to overthrow the

government, but principally to teach breathing exercises to promote good health. Many

people joined, however, not only to gain health benefits but also because they were

intrigued by Falun Gong's mysterious cosmology. Falun Gong is based on three simple

principles: truthfulness, benevolence, and tolerance.l ' These principles attracted many

who, in groups, practiced their stylized exercises in public park-like places.
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In the past, Christianity, among religious groups, received the greatest restrictions

14

by the CCP.

However, in 1999, the government became greatly concerned with non-

Western belief groups, such as the Falun Gong, that were derived from Buddhism and

Taoism. The members of these groups often face harassment, physical abuse, and

15

frequently prison.

None of the arrests has been connected with violence or actual threats

against society. Simply seeking legalization, the Falun Gong had demonstrated at

16

Tiananmen Square and in other public places.

The only "crimes" that the Falun Gong

had committed were that they practiced their beliefs outside government control, and

sought legalization of their practices. Not only did the government accuse the Falun Gong

of being an evil cult, however, but also it spread anti-Falun Gong propaganda throughout

the Chinese media. China's newspaper, People's Daily, a mouthpiece for the government,

and the Chinese Academy of Social Science accused Falun Gong's leader, Li Hongzhi, of

accumulating wealth and brainwashing his followers. Since the CCP controls the media,

police, security personnel, and the National People's Congress, it is easy for it to spread

propaganda and to arrest groups that it perceives oppose the state government. The news

media publishes false information about the Falun Gong, while the judicial system

justifies or hides crimes that the CCP commits against the leaders and followers of the

17

group.

Many of the arrested followers of the Falun Gong have been sent to prisons or

18

labor camps without trial.

"At the same time, the diplomatic system has spread lies in

the international community and enticed foreign governments, state officials and

14
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international media with political and economic incentives so that they will remain silent

19

regarding the issue of the prosecution of the Falun Gong."

However, the foreign press has reported the persecution of the Falun Gong in

China. Among these journalists, Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal won a Pulitzer

Prize in 2001 for his extraordinary work on the Falun Gong. He is known for covering

individual stories of Falun Gong members, reporting the torture and deaths, and

describing the cruel crackdown of the CCP against this organization. Johnson compares

the April 1999 crackdown on the Falun Gong to the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989,

stating that "it left countless scars below the surface of society, and has become another

20

marker on China's painful path to modernization. "

Besides torture and deaths, many

Chinese citizens are forced to split from their families, and move away from their homes

21

with the fear of arrest.

Johnson reveals to his readers the false propaganda spread by the

Chinese media against the Falun Gong members, and the hidden reality behind the

crackdowns. "In a country of 1.3 billion, most are ignorant and many accept the state-run

media's explanation that Falun Dafa is a dangerous cult, a mind-controlling organization

22

that must be crushed at all costs to preserve stability."

By 2000, it was estimated that 5,000 members of the Falun Gong had been sent to

23

the re-educated labor camps without trial.

To prove that the Falun Gong was unhealthy

to the mental stability of its members, the CCP sent many practitioners to psychiatric

19
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24

hospitals, making their families responsible for all living and medical expenses.

Amnesty International reported that lawyers were prevented from entering pleas of not

guilty, and, according to the International Human Rights Organization, they had to obtain

25

permission from the CCP to represent Falun Gong prisoners.

In 2002, the Department of State's report on religious freedom stated that several

hundred practitioners of the Falun Gong had died while in prison and in labor camps

26

since 1999.

"In early March [2008], the U.S.-based Falun Dafa Information Center

announced that 1,878 practitioners from 29 provinces had been arrested since January

2008 and that cash rewards ofup to $360 were being offered by the government to

27

identify members."

Although the Chinese government claims that China is governed by

the rule oflaw, the unjust treatment of Falun Gong believers is clear evidence to the

contrary.

Although the Falun Gong demanded to be recognized as a legal entity, which led

to the April 1999 crackdown, there have been no demonstrations by members of Falun

Gong or their supporters to overthrow the government. The April 1999 demonstration

demanded freedom and civil rights for Falun Gong members.

Although religious

freedom is essential to democracy, the demonstrations held by the Falun Gong were not a

call for broad-based religious freedom in China, however. The main reason for the 1999

demonstration was for tolerance of the group: the leaders and their followers wanted

nothing else but the freedom to practice their own beliefs in public places. What

24
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provoked the Falun Gong to demonstrate was the anti-Falun Gong propaganda that the

Chinese government spread, in part by planting defamatory articles in Chinese

newspapers. The members of the group responded by organizing sit-in demonstrations in

front of government buildings. Intense demonstrations by the Falun Gong began when

the CCP banned the group, and sent followers to prison and labor camps. Westerners,

such as scholars at the Brookings Institution, inclined to explain the demonstrations of

China's dissidents in democratic terms, interpreted the protests as being "on behalf of

tens and thousands of innocent people who suffer imprisonment, torture or even death at

28

the hands of their own government in China."

Victimization of Sanctioned Religions

Falun Gong is not the only faith-based group that the Chinese government controls and

persecutes. Many religious groups in China resist the government's control and operate

29

outside the official boundaries.

The response of the Chinese government to religious

groups has been mixed. House churches that operate in small villages and are not

30

spreading into other regions are not usually targeted by state officials.

Repression is

used by the Chinese government when it lacks the ability to control religious groups that

31

spread rapidly and are also linked with other movements.

Religious freedom is

frequently abused in the ethnic minority regions of Tibet and Xinjiang. Resistance to the

government's control erupted again in March 2008 among Tibetan Buddhists who follow

28

Erik Eckholm,"China Breaks up a Protest by Falun Gong Foreigners," Ni!W York Times, November 2 1 ,
2001,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9806E3DAIF3BF932Al5752CIA9679C8B63&scp=
3&sq=faluno/o20gong%20demonstrations&st=cse (accessed February 15, 2009).
29

Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin, God and Caesar in China (Arlington, VA: Brookings Institution
Press, 1992), 5.
30

Ibid.

31

Ibid.

59

the Dalai Lama, and martial law was unofficially imposed in the region in March 2009.

Muslims in Xinjiang, too, are prosecuted and refuse to practice their beliefs in registered

places of worship. Still, Henan, Anhui, and Shandong provinces have faced the broadest

religious persecution. Religionists in major urban centers are not excluded from

persecution, however, as arrests of leaders and members of unauthorized religious groups

are common in big cities such as Beijing, to prevent belief systems from spreading

rapidly. Christian underground churches, whether in urban or rural settings, are an

especially significant challenge to Chinese government officials, because authorities

cannot easily control them. They are constantly subject to government crackdown. As

religionists of any persuasion cannot publicly proclaim and spread their faiths, religious

persecution of Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, and Muslims, in particular, is one of the

most troublesome abuses of human rights in China.

Victimization o
f Church Leaders

Since the early 1990s, Amnesty International has reported that many church leaders,

32

including in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, and Hebei provinces, have been detained.

In 2001, Gong

Shengliang, a head of the South China Church, was sentenced to death, and severely

33

tortured and beaten in prison.

The Chinese government accused Gong of"establishing a

cult organization in the South China Christianity, raping women and violating social

34

order."

As with Falun Gong, the Chinese government spread accusations and

condemning information through the media, and called the South China Church an evil

32
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cult. The harsh treatment of Gong was part of a crackdown on the South China Church.

Gong was accused of raping six females, but the alleged victims released letters on

January 29, 2002, stating that they had been tortured by the state police and coerced into

35

providing false testimony against Gong.

The women had been beaten severely with

36

electric cords, until they implicated the church leader.

According to China Daily in

February 2003, Ye Xiaowen, director of the State Administration of Religious Affairs,

stated that "no one in the country is allowed to use religious affairs as an excuse to

37

undermine public order or damage the physical or mental health of other citizens. "

38

There was no indication whether there was an investigation or a court appeal for Gong.

However, there was intimation that the police received extra bonuses from the

government for the number of arrests and convictions of the South China Church

39

members.

Tibetan Buddhists

Since 1 9 5 1 , when the Chinese exercised full control of Tibet, the region has been a

40

source oftension.

After the 1959 Tibetan uprising against China's authoritarian regime,

the spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, fled to India in exile. During the late 1980s, China

declared martial Jaw and violently suppressed Tibetans, killing hundreds of protestors.

The clashes in Lhasa during the 1980s were by far the largest. In the light of the March
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2008 and March 2009 crackdowns, the Dalai Lama fears that the CCP-led government

41

will continue to violently persecute the Tibetans.

In 1995, government officials in Tibetan began campaigns to "reeducate" all

42

monks and nuns to be patriotic and to adopt socialist ideologies.

According to the

United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees, three thousand Tibetans entered Nepal

to escape the reeducation campaigns. "In February 1996, Chinese leaders ordered the

closure of politically active monasteries and required the replacement of all monastic

43

leaders. "

The reeducation campaigns started in three major monasteries, Sera, Drepung,

44

and Ganden, and reached fifty other monasteries and nunneries by June 1997 .

"By

September 1997 more than 900 of 1, 700 monasteries had been reached with 30,000 of

45

46,000 monks and nuns affected."

Those who resisted the reeducation campaigns and

did not denounce the Dalai Lama were imprisoned, tortured, and accused of political

46

activism.

The patriotic or reeducation campaigns were aimed at gaining control over the

Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and establishment. The one-party state does not take into

consideration international reaction from Western countries. The main objective of the

CCP is to suppress any mass movement that might advocate a high degree of regional

autonomy or separation from China, or act as a counter-witness to the government.

41
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Although the Chinese government asserts that the people of mainland China have

religious freedom, no religious group is exempt from government repression. In early

2009, it was estimated that there were approximately 6 million Tibetan Buddhists in

47

China.

However, the exact number cannot be known, because many Tibetan Buddhists

refuse to practice their religion under the control of the Chinese government. In February

2009, against government directives, they refused to participate in public ceremonies

celebrating Losar, the Tibetan New Year, and customarily avoid registering with the one-

party state.

State officials claim that Tibetan Buddhists have a right to freedom of religious

expression. However, they are not allowed to post pictures of the Dalai Lama in public

places, or anything that would advocate Tibetan independence or any form of

48

separatism.

The Chinese government maintains that the Dalai Lama is the leader of an

49

"exile government," and a "criminal" who is on a mission to separate China.

In a recent

article in China Daily, the government accused the Dalai Lama of trying restore a

theocracy in Tibet, and by doing so, of violating the Chinese Constitution and misleading

the public. The Memorandum on Genuine Anatomy of the Tibetan People was presented

by the Envoys of His Holiness the Dalai Lama to the Chinese officials on November 4,

2008, in Beijing, in an effort to find common ground between the Tibetans and the

Chinese people.l" The Memorandum did not seek Tibet's separation or independence, but

47
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instead called for respect of the integrity of the Tibetan people, which is compatible with

the principles of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China. Tibetan Buddhists

want Chinese officials to allow them to practice their religion freely. A section of the

Memorandum states the following:

Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to
their identity. We recognize the importance of separation of church and
state, but this should not affect the freedom and practice of believers. It is
impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom
without the freedom of belief, conscience and religion. The Constitution
recognizes the importance of religion and protects the right to profess it.
Article 36 guarantees all citizens the right to the freedom of religious
belief. No one can compel another to believe in or not to believe in any
51

religion. Discrimination on the basis ofreligion is forbidden.

However Chinese officials firmly believe that "religious activities, which might

52

affect other people, must be bound by law."

Tibetan Buddhists are suppressed despite

their peaceful attempts to seek common ground with the Chinese government. Since the

Tibetan Buddhists riots of March 2008, Tibetans have been targets of harsh treatment by

the Chinese government. In January 2009, the government enforced strict security in

Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, fearing demonstrations on the fiftieth anniversary of the Tibet

53

Uprising of March 10, 1959.

The police raided thousands of homes and businesses, ran

54

checks on 5,766 people, and arrested eighty-one as possible suspects.

The government

claimed that strict police enforcement was used to target "criminal activity such as

55

burglary, prostitution and theft and is needed to uphold the city's social order."

In truth,

the motive behind this campaign was to target suspected supporters of Tibetan

51

Ibid.
52

Ibid.
53

Maureen Fan, "Chinese Launch Raids, Detention in Tibet: Activists See Goal as Punishing Last Spring's
Rioters and Quelling New Protests," Washington Post, January 29, 2009, washingtonpost.com/
/content/article/2009/0I/28/AR2009012801176.html?hpid=moreheadlines (accessed March 28, 2009).
54

Ibid.
55

Ibid.

64

independence, and to warn other Tibetans of the possible consequences. On March 10,

2009, the Dalai Lama said that, "Chinese rule in Tibet has created a 'hell on earth' that

56

has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands ofTibetans."

Local officials forbade

foreign press from entering many areas of Tibet, and some foreign journalists were

detained; also, Internet services, along with text messages, were unplugged to prevent

57

people from organizing demonstrations.

Before the Summer Olympics in 2008 in Beijing, the Chinese government played

a major role in the crackdown on the protestors in Tibet. On March 14, 2008, Chinese

forces surrounded three monasteries outside Lhasa, after hundreds of Tibetan Buddhist

58

protestors took to the streets against the rule of the communist regime.

Tibetan

protesters raised their human rights complaints and their desire for an independent Tibet,

59

to test the government officials to see if military force would be used against them.

The

Chinese government ordered tight security, and made the protestors aware of the harsh

punishments for demonstrating against party officials in Beijing. Reports of the protests

in Tibet were censored in the Chinese news media, and it was only after international

pressure that foreign reporters were allowed to enter Tibet shortly after the

demonstrations. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the number of protesters who were

arrested, injured, or killed. However, it is estimated that five to six hundred Tibetan

Buddhist monks were arrested and tortured in prison. Before the Summer Olympics,

56
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China faced heightened criticism from the international arena about abuse of the human

rights of Tibetan Buddhists and religionists of other areas in China. However, the

government claims that it acts constitutionally according to article 36 of China's

Constitution, which states that, "No one may make use of religion to engage in activities

that disrupt the public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational

60

system of the state."

Thus, when the state forces monks and nuns to be reeducated in

patriotic campaigns, or incarcerates them, it can claim that these religionists have violated

public order by means of their demonstrations, and, consequently, are deserving of

punishment.

The Uighur Minority in Xinjiang

In the case ofXinjiang, many Muslims are persecuted and often accused of terrorist acts.

The CCP uses the September 1 1 terrorist attacks as a rationale to crackdown on Muslims.

The Uighurs enjoyed brief independence in the 1940s, in what was known as Republic of

East Turkistan. Since then, there have been numerous protests by the people ofXinjiang

61

to urge separation from the People's Republic ofChina.

"People from the Uighur

community are very much at risk of being arrested, detained, tortured or sentenced to

labour camps for anything the government equates to separatist feelings, or for holding

62

religious activities."

Despite China's Constitution that promises "freedom of religious

belief," state officials organize campaigns to marginalize Muslims in their own society.

Muslim minorities protested in significant number in Tiananmen Square in 1989.
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Rather than carrying signs of democracy and freedom, the religious demonstrators, in

general, held up banners reading, "Respect China's Freedom and Religion," and "Uphold

3

the Constitution.',6

Muslim protestors reached about three thousand, including Muslim

64

students.

Unlike the Muslim students, older Muslim males wore white hats, and the

women wore head coverings to identify themselves as a Muslim minority. Most Muslim

demonstrators were students, however, who were offended by a book that was published

65

by the Chinese government, entitled Sexual Custome.

The book denigrated the Muslim

66

religion because it implied that Muslims practiced homosexuality and sodomy.

The

Muslims' response to the book in 1989 led to many demonstrations, including by the

three thousand protestors in Beijing on May 12, some twenty thousand already having

67

marched in the capital of Gansu at the end of April.

Approximately ten thousand also

demonstrated in the capital of Qinghai and in numerous other smaller protests in Urumqi,

68

Shanghai, Inner Mongolia, Wuhan, and Yunnan.

Democratization in Protestant and Catholic Countries

Protestant countries developed rapidly in terms of their economies during the period of

Western industrialization. The Protestant work ethic is thought to have contributed to the

69

general well-being and economic advancement of these countries.

The Protestant

countries were also the first to democratize. The founding fathers of the United States
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promoted liberal democracy based on freedom of choice, temperance, and democratic

70

accountability, all rooted in their Protestant beliefs.

In the case ofNew England,

Protestant domination resulted in parliamentary democracy. The United States, United

Kingdom, Holland, and Switzerland were Reformed Protestant countries that avoided

71

authoritarian leaders and adopted democracy.

Protestant characteristics are solidly

rooted in the promotion of individual rights and self-reliance.

Catholic countries also became democracies, but not until the 1970s, as they had

a history of authoritarian leadership that was supported by the indigenous hierarchical

Roman Catholic Church. The Second Vatican Ecumenical Council opened under Pope

John XXIII in 1962 and ended under Pope Paul VI in 1965. (The First Vatican Council

was adjourned in 1870, and never met again; five popes reigned before the Second

Vatican Council was proclaimed by Pope John XXIII.)

Pope John XXIII aimed to

reform the Church from within. Following the Council in the 1970s, Pope John Paul II

and the Holy See became more concerned with the struggle against authoritarianism and

72

with the promotion of human rights.

John Paul II identified the Roman Catholic Church

as the "guardian to freedom which is the condition and basis for the human person's true

73

dignity."

Major processes of democratization began in Catholic countries such as

Poland, Brazil, the Philippines, Argentina, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Haiti,

74

Chile, and Paraguay.

Poland, a dominantly Catholic country, overcame communism

with the help of Pope John Paul II. With the assistance of Poland's Catholic Church, he
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organized opposition to the communist regime through the support of the Solidarnosc

75

(Soliditary) movement.

Lack of Unity and Determination

But unlike Poland, or any other small country that became a democracy through the help

of its Christian churches, China is a large nation consisting of many different religions

and sects. Although there are large numbers of Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, Tibetan

Buddhists, and other believers, there is no mass organization, such as Solidarity, to

challenge the government, or to promote elections of new leaders. It seems that each

individual religious group demonstrates for its own cause rather than for the common

good of everyone. The Tibetan Buddhists protest for their own human and religious rights,

the Falun Gong demonstrated for its official sanction and against false propaganda in the

media, and the Muslims in Xinjiang are resentful of being portrayed as terrorists by

government officials, while seeking greater autonomy. There is no mass organization in

China, however, that aims to challenge the government's control of power. If a religious

group develops rapidly and is well organized, the government quickly suppresses its

members and imprisons its leaders.

If the people of China want to pursue freedom practices, they must do so under

the government's rule, and there can be no political agenda. Because of the variety of

people in China and the massive number of problems that face the country, there is a

constant threat of social instability. This is so especially in regions with ethnic minorities,

but also in rural areas where there is widespread poverty, as well as widespread

"David Marquand and Ronald L. Nettler, Religion and Democracy (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2000), 90.
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underground religious practice. The CCP controls religious movements, however, and

even if Protestants or Catholics organized a demonstration to demand religious freedom,

other citizens of China likely would not join it. Because China is not unified religiously

and there are many religious groups pressing for their own separate causes, to date,

religious organizations do not appear to be incubators of democracy. Moreover, many

Chinese do not practice any religion, and are seemingly satisfied with the government.

Since the government distorts the concept of democracy, many citizens believe

that, indeed, democracy exists in China. Many rights exist on paper, as shown in article

36 of the Constitution. But if the CCP believes that religionists are disruptive to society,

and in many cases this is the government's claim, it simply jails them without a trial. In

the eyes of most middle-class citizens who have jobs and apartments owed to China's

economic growth, however, they see nothing wrong with the government of China. On

the contrary, they are very satisfied with it because the CCP has provided an environment

in which they can fulfill their personal wants and needs. Thus, there is no outrage

expressed by China's influential middle class over religious persecution.

Although there have been international pressures on China to play a positive role

in protecting human rights, the economic crisis of 2008-2009 has prioritized the agenda.

During her March 2009 trip to China, Hillary Clinton announced that human rights

76

matters would not be at the top of her planned discussions with Chinese officials.

As the

United States is in the vanguard of promoting Western-style democracy, the Secretary of

State should indeed retain human rights at the top of the American foreign policy agenda.
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However, as shown by administration policies since Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong's

Shanghai Communique of 1972, Washington's policies toward China have never

changed human rights practices in the PRC. Fixing the economic crisis will not help

protect human rights, nor will it increase freedoms in the PRC. Instead, economy

recovery will help China's central government officials to recruit more CCP members,

expand China's military, and gain more control over religious and other groups that are

perceived to pose a threat to the government.
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Chapter6

Abusive Activities of the Chinese Government Abroad:

How China's Foreign Relations Promote Dictatorship and Terrorism

The Chinese government not only abuses human rights domestically, but also

internationally. China has allied itself with third-world regimes, and does business with a

number of them that are notorious for abuse of human rights. Its leaders claim that their

activities in Africa and Latin America are purely economic and have no political

dimension. In truth, China's interest in gaining access to oil reserves plays an important

political role in countries such as Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela. As Sudan, Iran, and

Venezuela are its main oil partners, China not only makes investments in these countries

that abet dictatorship and terrorism, but also its foreign policy practices in these countries

exacerbate violations of universal human and civil rights norms, to the vigorous objection

of democratic developed nations. Groups in Darfur continue to suffer grave abuses of

their human rights, and the evolved dictatorship in Venezuela has effectively abolished

democracy. Thus, China confronted an awkward public-relations dilemma in the run-up

to the August 2008 Olympics in Beijing, labeled the "Genocide Olympics" by some

critics of China's leadership. China's refusal, in collaboration with Russia, to support

United Nations Security Council sanctions against the military junta in Myanmar that

cracked down on pro-democracy demonstrations in September 2007, further dulled its

already tarnished international image, stemming from its activities in Sudan and

Venezuela.
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that the Sudanese government will be able to collect as much as $30 billion in 2012, and

4

much more if countries such as China continue to invest in the country's oil production.

Since 2003, over two million people have died or become refugees in Darfur, and

5

the killing still continues.

In the case of Darfur, (PHR) Physicians for Human Rights Record has
concluded that there is ample indication that an organized campaign on the
part of the Government of Sudan is underway, targeting several million
non-Arab Darfurian inhabitants for removal from this region of the
country, either by death (most common through immediate violence or
slow starvation) or forced migration. GoS forces allied with the Janjaweed
militia, have caused intense disruption and destruction for non-Arab
Darfurian holdings, communities, families, and all means oflivehood and
necessities. By destroying, stealing or preventing the access to food, water
and medicine, the GoS and the Janjaweed are creating conditions destined
6

to destroy the non-Arab Darfurians.

China's oil investment in Sudan is funding terrorism, and Chinese officials do not take

into consideration human rights violated in Darfur. In the run-up to the 2008 Olympics,

the Chinese government suggested that it would pressure the Sudanese government to

moderate its actions, as international condemnation of Chinese policies in Sudan mounted.

However, little progress has been noted in the region.

China's Thirst for Oil in Sudan

China's rapid global development depends on greater access to more resources than it has

domestically; with its large population and rapid economic expansion, China is in need of

natural

gas and oil.

In the early

1990s,

it was predicted that,

by 2000,

China might

4
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5
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experience a shortfall of about fifty million tons of crude oil, or about one-third of its oil

7

needs.

On December 6,

largest

share,

1996, China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) gained the

40 percent,

of Greater Nile

Petroleum

Operating

Company

(GNPOC),

8

which is the largest oil operation in Sudan.

In 1998, China Petroleum Engineering &

Construction Cooperation (CPECC) participated in the construction of a pipeline, which

9

was the largest Chinese project abroad.

"CNPC had received revenue of more than U.S.

$600 million from the GNPOC concession since exports began in September 1999, and

Sudan

accounted

for

two-thirds

of

CNPC's

overseas

production

in

2000.

CNPC's

dependence on Sudanese crude oil continued to expand, importing 2.69 million tons from

10

Sudan in January to June 2001, up 38 percent from the year before."

According to the

Washington Post, in 2004, Sudan's oil reserves were 563 million barrels, double what

11

they had been in 2001.

In 2007, it was estimated that China was buying two-thirds of

12

Sudan's oil.

Despite the genocide in Darfur, energy-hungry China continues to invest in

Sudan's oil, blatantly ignoring human rights abuses by the Sudanese government.

China's Activities in Venezuela

China

also

Agreements

invests

in

between

improvement

of

Venezuela,

Venezuela

which

has

a very

and China involve

communications

in

Venezuela

poor

record

on

human

construction of railroads

through

the

purchase

of

rights.

and

the

satellite

7

Human Rights Watch, "China's Involvement in Sudan: Arms and Oil,"http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/
sudanl 103/26.htm (accessed October 25, 2007).
8

Ashlid Kolas, "China in African Oil: Guilty as Charged?" Economists for Peace and Security,
http://www.epsusa.org/publications/newsletter/june2007/kolas.htm (accessed October 13, 2007).
9

Human Rights Watch, "China's Involvement in Sudan: Anns and Oil."
IO

Ibid.

II

Peter S. Goodman, "China Invests Heavily in Sudan's Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on
Villagers," Washington Post, December 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A2 l 1432004Dec22_2.html (accessed October 1 1 , 2007).
12

Ibid.

75

capability

from

Venezuela.

Both

China.

In

countries

2005,

signed

Chinese

Vice

a long-term

President

agreement,

Zeng

Qinghong

securing

China's

visited

stake

in

Venezuela's oil and gas fields. The Chinese invested U.S. $350 billion in fifteen oil fields

13

in

Eastern

Venezuela.

In

March

2007,

Venezuela

and

China

signed

an agreement

permitting China to export from Venezuela 500,000 barrels of oil per day. In September

2007, the Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) and CNPC signed a petition to form a joint

venture company. Venezuela will own 60 percent of the oil, and China will control 40

14

percent.

During the economic downturn of 2008-2009, China has been cutting deals

around the globe for gas and oil. In January 2009, China sold Venezuela a $400 million

15

satellite, eighteen military jet aircraft, and a radar defense system.

In return, China buys

a per-diem average of 338,000 barrels of oil from Venezuela, and it is speculated that it

16

will import 1 million barrels a day by 2010.

In February 2009, Venezuelan President

Hugo Chavez and Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping signed an agreement increasing the

fund from $ 4 billion to $ 1 2 billion for oil development."

Friendly Relations between China and Venezuela

Venezuela's and China's support for each other also became visible when Venezuela

"voted for China's no action motion against the anti-China proposals put forward by the

13
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United States, at the 55th, 56th, and 57th sessions of the UN Human Rights Committee

18

(HRC)."

Russia, along with Sudan and other underdeveloped countries characterized

by extensive human rights violations,

States,

Canada,

proposal

by the

Japan,

United

and

almost

States

all

faithfully voted in favor of China.

European

countries

at the UN General

voted

Assembly

against

against

The United

China.

China's

The

Human

Rights violations failed. China's foreign investments in, and strong ties to, Venezuela and

the China-influenced African bloc has helped Venezuela to prevail in its human rights

1

violations. During the 55th, 56 1\ and the 57th Human Rights sessions, Venezuela strongly

19

supported China's entrance into the World Trade Organization in 200 I.

Since China's

economy had been rapidly growing, it was in President Chavez's interest to support his

ally.

Military Supply

In 2006, President Bush banned sales of weapons to Venezuela. Hugo Chavez responded

20

by saying, "It doesn't matter to us. It doesn't matter at all."

It really does not matter,

because China has been selling weapons to Venezuela. In 2005, China signed a contract

21

with the Venezuelan government to supply three JVL-1-type radar systems.

The

contract also included the provision of a complete command and control system, spare

parts, training, technical assistance, and the lease of a communication satellite, all for the

18
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modest price of U.S. $ 1 5 0 million.22 On February 17, 2009, Hugo Chavez was "re-

elected" as the President of Venezuela. "The victory came about because of Chavez's

gross misuse of government funds, government workers and federal facilities for the

23

campaign, and neighborhood enforcers to 'persuade' voters to support him."

Chavez

imposed a referendum, in which he eliminated term limits for the president's term, and he

4

plans to stay in power until 2049.2

Since Chavez controls Venezuela's Congress, the

Supreme Court, and the National Electoral Council, which supervises elections, he was

25

able to manipulate the elections so that the people voted in his favor.

China and Iran

China's relationship with Iran also poses a threat to democratic free nations. The strong

partnership in crude oil between China and Iran threatens the ability of the United States

and its allies to pressure Iran on its nuclear program. China imported more than 40

percent oflran's crude oil in 2004. With China's growing population and economic

development, it is aggressively trying to secure its future oil supply. Consistent with its

claims in Sudan, China maintains that its ties with Iran are purely economic, and have no

political implications. In 2004, Chinese officials began their effort to build oil fields in

26

Iran, which would allow them to export oil directly to China.

Also, they signed a

22
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27

contract with Iran to buy 250 million tons of natural gas over the next thirty years.

By

signing this contract, Iran became obligated to export 150,000 barrels of crude oil per day

28

over the term of the contract.

Records show that China imported 225 million barrels of

29

crude oil in 2003, 13 percent ofit from Iran alone.

oflranian crude oil rose by 14 percent."

From 2006 to 2007, China's imports

In March 2009, China invested U . S . $ 3.2

billion in Iran's two gas production lines, which will produce about U.S. $10.5 million

31

annually in natural gas.

The close relationship between China and Iran worries the

United States and other democratic countries in the United Nations Security Council.

China's oil relationship with Iran led to the Chinese delegation's veto of UN Security

Council Resolution 1737 to impose sanctions on Iran to pressure it to end its nuclear

32

program.

Resolution 1737 was proposed on July 3 1 , 2006, and called for Iranian

33

"suspension of suspect activities. "

China's supply of advanced military capability to Iran concerns Western nations.

After the terrorist attack on September 1 1 , 2001, the United States government took

action to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan and other radical Islamists in the Middle-East

region. Since Iran borders Iraq and Afghanistan, Sino-Iranian relations are relevant to the

outcome of the wars in the region. China's cooperation is needed to fight terrorism. By

27
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supplying Iran with military material, China is supporting the Taliban, as these weapons

34

are turning up in the hands of Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

Despite numerous appeals, the United States charges that China continues to

supply weaponry to Iran. Weapons of mass destruction, including missile programs from

China, end up in Pakistan and Afghanistan, now the world's chief area of terrorist activity.

After the terrorist attacks on September 1 1 , 2001, the United States government imposed

sixty sanctions on China for its proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile

sales to Iran. In 2004, China pledged that it would not export any weapons to a country

35

that did not honor the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In

September 2007, ten tons of Chinese weaponry were discovered in Herat, one of the

36

Afghanistan's provinces.

The United States continues to be concerned about China's

supplying Iran with lethal military capability, despite many sanctions, bans, and warnings.

Sponsoring Dictatorship and Terrorism

The

genocide

in

Darfur

continues,

meanwhile,

the

Chinese

government

writes

off

Sudan's debt and gives more aid to the country, which is not used to promote peace but to

supply

the

government

in Khartoum

with

more

military

capability.

China plays

no

positive role in Darfur. It does not want to acknowledge responsibility for sponsoring acts

of dictatorship and terrorism,

whether in

Sudan or Venezuela.

There

is a very

close

correlation among China's support for the governments of Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela.
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The

governments

are

China's

leading

partners

in

oil

investment.

The

Bush

Administration banned oil investments in Sudan, stopped military sales to Venezuela, and

placed

sanctions

on

Iran

for

its

development

of nuclear

warfare

capability.

These

governments engage in torture and disregard the value of human life. China sides with

Sudan, Iran, and Venezuela, ignoring any negative image this partiality creates among

democratic nations. The disapproval of the United States and other Western countries

does not effectively influence

China's foreign policy.

Events such as the Tiananrnen

massacre and the crackdown in Tibet in 2008 and in 2009 remind us that the Chinese

government does not have high regard for human and civil rights within its own country,

so,

therefore,

there

is

little

reason

to

expect

elsewhere.

81

that

it

will

care

about

abuse

of them

Conclusion

There have been many theories about whether China will democratize or remain an

authoritarian regime. The most popular speculation as to why China might modernize

concerns the pressures on the government for political liberalization brought to bear by a

rising educated middle class. Because large numbers of Chinese students since the 1980s

have traveled to the United States and other Western democracies, many scholars and

politicians have speculated that these students would return to China with Western ideas,

and create a mass movement to somehow rid the nation of its authoritarian government.

In this thesis, however, such expectation has been shown to lack merit. The educated

middle class in China has little understanding of Western-style democracy, and it has not

been broadly exposed to Western literature and philosophical thought. Under communist

leadership, students have not been taught the fundamental abstract concepts ofWestern

style democracy. The student protests in the 1980s used slogans of democracy and

freedom, but the demonstrators' true focus was fulfillment of their individual needs,

including jobs, housing, and other benefits from the CCP-led government. They did not

promote human rights in Tibet or elsewhere in China, nor did they mention unfair

taxation of China's peasants. They did complain about government corruption,

interpreted in part as the officials' not planning to place students in positions that they

thought they deserved. The students were terrified and outraged that the government did

not respond to their needs. In their demonstrations, they did not cry out for democracy;

rather, they demanded better lives for themselves. In fact, at the beginning of the 1989

protests, the students did not want the workers to join their demonstrations because they

felt that the elite class (of which they considered themselves a part) should demand their

82

own individual rights. Not until later, did the students invite the workers' support in order

to create a bigger mass to pressure the government to respond. The Chinese government

viewed the demonstrators as undermining its power, and the students did not anticipate

the severe consequences.

Since the Tiananmen Square crackdown, the government has continued to suppress

peasant, worker, religious, and other demonstrations. The CCP keeps tight control of

religious groups, monitoring places of worship and the growing memberships of religious

organizations.

Any religious group that attempts to worship freely beyond government

control is quickly suppressed by party officials. The Chinese government has been

particularly harsh on Tibetan Buddhists, Muslim minorities, underground Christians, and

Falun Gong.

The Tiananmen Square crackdown and constant persecution of religious groups have

created an unfavorable international image for China. But despite pressures from Western

democratic countries on the Chinese government to embrace political liberalization, it

continues to violate the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which it

is suppose to honor.

Throughout its history, China has remained a repressive and undemocratic country.

Owed to its building economic and military power, China now poses a potential threat to

democratic countries around the world. Its political repression, religious persecution,

proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons of mass destruction, and unfair trade

practices make it difficult for the Chinese government to legitimately defend its actions

and persuade other countries that it is moving toward democracy. Despite the rise of

83

China's educated middle class, there has been no fundamental change within the CCP

government to take steps toward power sharing. The Chinese government continues to

resist political liberalization, and its top priority is to prevent any weakening of the party.

It could "continue cautious political reforms that will enhance the state's ability to

manage the challenges created by China's rapid economic development,"! but such

political reforms are apt to be cosmetic and unlikely to lead to power sharing or to a

Western notion of democracy.

Since

the

1978

reform

efforts

of

Deng

Xiaoping,

China

has

developed

economically and militarily, but has remained a Leninist state politically. The Chinese

government

ignores

international

pressures

for

political

reform,

and

despite

many

scholars having speculated that the rising educated middle class-exposed to Western

ideas-would

prompt

liberal

political

changes

and

perhaps

even

a

desire

among

influential people to challenge the government, the middle class still lacks a fundamental

appreciation of Western-style democracy. Ongoing demonstrations and riots reveal that

there is tenuous political stability in the country, which political liberalization could help

to abate.

China's approach to human and civil rights goes back to

Confucian ethical

norms, in which individualism and self-fulfillment were discouraged. On the contrary,

Confucianism promoted dependence, preservation of the status quo, and state control,

which

fostered

authoritarianism,

and,

thus,

generations of communist leadership.

I
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common

ground

with

China's

four

China

consistently

violates

many

provisions

of the

Universal

Declaration

of

Human Rights. For years, the Chinese government has claimed that, under the Chinese

Constitution, every citizen has freedom of religious belief, and thus the ability to worship

in one's own religion. In truth, China has repressed any religious that group has appeared

organized outside government control or that has been perceived to have the potential to

be a counter-witness against the government. The loopholes deliberately embedded in

China's Constitution, such as those in article 36 on freedom ofreligious belief, tell us that

state officials distort Western democratic understandings and the norms embraced by the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights in order to secure the option to suppress China's

citizens.

The Chinese government represents to its citizens that China is sharing in the

democratic experience. Yet, village elections that are supposed to be a manifestation of

China's movement toward political liberalization are controlled by the government, and

voters' political attitudes are not permitted to counter the policies and practices of state

officials. The government controls the media, and the foreign press is not permitted to

report about major protests and government crackdowns, such as those in Tiananmen

Square in 1989, and in Tibet in March 2008 and March 2009. In 1989, the government

cut satellite links to prevent events from being covered internationally, and in March

2009, foreign reporters were banned from much of Tibet so that the realities about the

undeclared martial law that had been imposed would not be revealed.

In light of continued state repression, the critical question to answer is whether

the middle class will demand democracy in China in the near future. The likelihood is

that it will not. There is no sense of unity between the middle classes and lower classes of
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China, and the middle class is concerned with its own priorities rather than with the needs

of the whole country. The Tiananmen Square protests of 1989 support this hypothesis. In

the eyes of people in the international arena, the educated middle-class students who

protested

in

Beijing

in

1989,

had

open

minds

to

Western

ideas

and

protested

for

democracy. In reality, these students, not exposed to Western philosophical works, had

little understanding of what democracy really is. They used slogans of democracy and

freedom, but did the

students really want democracy, or were they worried foremost

about their personal needs?

The 1978 reforms of Deng Xiaoping's second generation ofCCP leadership led to

rapid economic growth and job competition among the educated middle class. Uncertain

about their futures, the students came from their Lawn Salons into the streets. Yet, they

had

little

inclination to

draw workers

into their movement because

they

wanted the

government's attention to be centered on their particular needs and demands. Only when

the

government

did

not respond to

the

students,

did they

encourage the

workers

to

support them. The educated middle class benefits from decent jobs, satisfactory income,

and the benefits of being a CCP member, advantages that are absent among China's

lower classes.

Consequently, members of the middle class are unlikely to oppose the

government as long as they are satisfied with their standard of living.

Due to the economic crisis of 2008-2009, many middle-class employees have lost

their jobs, and some twenty million migrant workers have become unemployed owed to

factory closings, forcing many to return to their rural villages. The government fears that

there might be a large demonstration, such as the one in Tiananmen Square in 1989, this

time

organized

by

laborers

and

members
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of

the

middle

class,

protesting

against

government

corruption

and

demanding

protection

of

their

wages.

Just

like

other

demonstrations, new protests owed to the economic decline most likely would not call for

fundamental changes within the Chinese government, however. Once again, protesters

would

be

apt

to

call

for

the

fulfillment

of their

individual

needs,

and

not

for

the

realization of abstract principles of democracy.

The demonstrations of the 1980s did not reflect unity among the Chinese people

in a call

for radical political

change.

The protests

of 1985

and

1986 were raised

in

response to the uncertainties of changing times, more than they were an expression of

anti-government sentiments. The dismantling of communes, the neglect of millions of

students sent to countryside and left there, the tensions between the one-child policy and

the household responsibility system which placed an emphasis on family-based power,

the looming end to the "iron rice bowl," spreading corruption, criticism of the Special

Economic Zones (SEZs),

contributed

favorably.

assurances

to

the

unrest

and reduction in the

among

people

who

size of the

did

not

CCP and China's military

view

The doubt and insecurities of the protesters in the

from

their

government.

Likewise,

the

Deng's

modernizations

1980s led them to seek

demonstrations

of

1989

were

an

outgrowth of great social strains. Inflation had reached some 26 percent by the end of

1988, leading to panic buying and hoarding, as people confronted a decline in their living

standards. Peasants who were forced to sell their grain quota to the government at low

procurement prices became embittered as the government paid them in promissory notes

that could not be used to purchase food or fuel. Strikes erupted as workers were laid off

or their wage payments fell behind. And, educated youth came to realize that they had no

lucrative jobs on the horizon and that they lacked the contacts, or guanxi, that customarily
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provided them. Frustrated and displeased with their circumstances, students took to the

streets. When top-level government officials did not respond to their appeals, the students

felt abandoned. They saw themselves as an elite group entitled to a better life, and as

having gained little from Deng's reforms. Cab drivers and uneducated entrepreneurs, they

bitterly noted, were earning more than university graduates. The students raised symbols

and

used

slogans

of democracy

at Tiananmen

Square,

but in truth wanted

financial

security and the prestige to which they thought they were entitled.

The

middle

class

might

protest

again

if the

government

is

perceived

as not

providing a secure economic future. However, the lesson that the students learned during

the Tiananmen crackdown was not to underestimate the brutal determination of their

government. Chinese authorities will do whatever they believe is necessary to protect

their regime, including making key decisions, as occurred in 1989, that contravene even

the CCP' s constitution. They are fearful of yielding to any demand, as this might weaken

their monopoly on power. Concern for human rights, either domestically or abroad, does

not play a role in shaping policy, and international image is not a factor when it comes to

protecting existing central authority.

Although China is marked by many injustices, the middle class is unlikely to seek

a new political system, because its members are comfortable with what the government

presently offers. It is not disposed to have interest in replacing the existing leadership,

unless,

perhaps,

its ne eds

are

not

met.

Furthermore,

the

brutality

of the

Tiananmen

Square crackdown and the March 2008 and March 2009 crackdowns in Tibet reminds the

citizens of China that it is extremely difficult to oppose the Chinese government. Lessons

learned by citizens in the past created public awareness that the government will quickly
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suppress movements that could threaten it, leaving China hopeless regarding fundamental

change in the regime.

It has been twenty years since the

continue their justification

1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, and to

of suppression,

officials

claim that crackdowns

and other

elements of state control are essential to preserving social stability, which, in turn, is

essential to economic growth. This logic permits suppression of labor rights activists,

religious protestors, and demonstrations among peasants.

Not much has changed in China's political system since the 1989 massacre. The

CCP still represses individuals who call for fulfillment of their human rights and civil

liberties, and the Chinese government continues to disregard human rights abroad, by

supporting repressive dictatorships in countries

including Myanmar,

Venezuela.

in

Having

the

third

largest

economy

the

world,

and

Sudan,

Iran,

a rapidly

and

building

militarily, an increasing number of observers are concerned that China will pose a threat

to

other

countries,

especially

in

East

Asia,

as it

reaches

superpower

status

under

a

Leninist-style authoritarian regime. Siding with the dictatorial regimes in Sudan, Iran,

Venezuela, and elsewhere, China supplies these ally countries with military weapons,

technology, and resources that harm innocent civilians, such as those who have died in

Darfur. In many ways, China's relationships with unsavory regimes erode peace efforts in

war-torn regions, including, among other places, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

There

is

no

evidence

that

China's

integration

into

globalization

will

lead

to

China's democratization. It has been over ten years since the last country in East Asia,

Indonesia, transitioned into democracy. Authoritarianism in East Asia runs deeply. It is
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estimated that China's middle class will reach 40 percent of China's population by 2020,

meaning that the Chinese government must be on guard to keep this elite class prosperous

and satisfied. Yet, the unwritten bargain that the government made with urban elite in

1989 is not likely to change:

wealth,

the educated class of China can pursue accumulation of

as long as it remains remote from politics. Meanwhile, poor labor conditions,

very low wages, and unfavorable conditions for human rights are likely to continue, as

they contribute to China's global economic

competitiveness.

Without the unity of the

Chinese people or their desire to demonstrate and demand fundamental change within the

government, there will be no movement toward democracy. And, without democracy,

there will be serious limitations to human rights and civil liberties in China for the long

term future. Chinese citizens would have to gain an appreciation for abstract principles of

democracy, before China could move toward democratization. But to realize what a true

Western-style democracy is, would not be

sufficient;

the

Chinese

also would have to

desire it. To date, there is no significant aspiration or momentum for democratic political

change in China among its vast Han majority.
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